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THESIS

LESSONS FROM THE PAST: VITAL FACTORS INFLUENCING MILITARY ADVISORS IN KOREA, VIETNAM, AND AFGHANISTAN

by

David T. Gardner

March 2012

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Security assistance and cooperation operations are a pivotal aspect of U.S. foreign and security policy. The United States has a long history of assisting friendly foreign nations with financing, training and equipment as a means of furthering U.S. interests in the region. Inherent within these operations is the role of the military advisor. This thesis represents a historical analysis of advisory operations, specifically systematic case studies of Korea and Vietnam, and provides seven vital factors that have significant influence on an advisor's ability to effectively promote increased military capabilities of his indigenous counterpart. These vital factors are then be applied to contemporary advisory operations within Afghanistan as a means of critiquing progress thus far. The concluding chapter makes policy reform recommendations for future operations based on the narrative developed throughout the systematic case studies.

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Security assistance and cooperation operations are a pivotal aspect of U.S. foreign and security policy. The United States has a long history of assisting friendly foreign nations with financing, training and equipment as a means of furthering U.S. interests in the region. Inherent within these operations is the role of the military advisor. This thesis represents a historical analysis of advisory operations, specifically systematic case studies of Korea and Vietnam, and provides seven vital factors that have significant influence on an advisor's ability to effectively promote increased military capabilities of his indigenous counterpart. These vital factors are then be applied to contemporary advisory operations within Afghanistan as a means of critiquing progress thus far. The concluding chapter makes policy reform recommendations for future operations based on the narrative developed throughout the systematic case studies.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANA	Afghan National Army
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command Afghanistan
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
ETT	Embedded Training Team
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
KMAG	United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
KTMC	Kabul Military Training Center
MAAG-V	Military Advisory and Assistance Group, Vietnam
MATA	Military Assistance Training Advisory course
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan
OMLT	Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
PMAG	Provincial Military Advisory Group
ROK	Republic of Korea
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SAO	Security Assistance Operations
SCO	Security Cooperation Operations
SIGUR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

TERM	Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission
USAFIK	U.S. Army Forces in Korea
USAMGIK	United States Army Military Government in Korea

I. INTRODUCTION

A. CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General Fogh Rasmussen said, "[the Taliban] might think they can wait us out. But within a year or so [of summer 2010], there will be over 300,000 Afghan soldiers and police trained and ready to defend their country. And they can't be waited out."[1] Secretary-General Rasmussen's optimistic claim was based on the projected growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) being developed through the efforts of NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A). Interestingly, just three weeks later, in late June 2010, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGUR), established by the U.S. Congress to provide independent reporting and audits within Afghanistan, released a report that exposed significant issues with U.S. military assessments of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Specifically, SIGUR found that,

> The measurements used in the assessment system overstated the capabilities of the ANSF, particularly for top-rated army and police units that did not always maintain the ability to conduct independent operations.[2]

SIGUR's claim was substantiated in August 2010, when 300 men from the First Brigade, 201st Army Corps were sent into a village called Bad Pakh in Laghman Province, in an attack against the Taliban, which was completely uncoordinated with U.S. or NATO forces. Though touted as among the best units in the ANA, they suffered heavy casualties and ultimately required NATO assistance for withdrawal.[3] This event, as well as numerous others raised questions concerning the Afghans' ability to maintain security and stability once U.S. and international forces depart. More specifically,

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[1] Anders Fogh Rasmussen. "Monthly Press Briefing," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 7, 2010, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_64083.htm.

[2] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 2010. *Quarterly report to the United States Congress*. Third Quarter. 14

[3] Rod Norland. "Showcase Afghan Army Mission Turns Into Debacle," *The New York Times*. August 12, 2010. Http://Www.Nytimes.Com/2010/08/13/World/Asia/13afghan.Html

incidents such as Bad Pakh call into question the ability of the United States and NTM-A to fully develop the ANSF into a self-sufficient and capable military.

Within the field of Security Assistance Operations (SAO), such as those conducted by the United States and NTM-A in Afghanistan, military advisors play a key role. In order to assess the effectiveness of SAO in Afghanistan, it is necessary to evaluate the performance of military advisors and the degree to which they are able to achieve their assigned objectives. In order to establish a baseline understanding of military advisors, it is necessary to examine the most significant U.S. security assistance operations that have taken place throughout the world since the U.S. achieved military superiority following World War II. The objective of this study is to present a systematic case study analysis of military advisors engaged in security assistance operations. In so doing, this study will identify key variables that shape the success or failure of advisory operations. Once identified, these variables can then be applied to the war in Afghanistan. Fundamental aspects of the advisory process transcend both borders and conflicts. These aspects will provide an accurate critique of the evolution of U.S. military assistance, providing a way ahead for operations in Afghanistan.

B. POLICY RELEVANCE

The United States is scheduled to complete a roll back of combat forces deployed to Afghanistan by 2014. Believing they have diminished the influence and operational capacity of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. government is seeking to transfer security sector responsibility to the Afghans. The ANSF must achieve self-sufficiency for internal and external security in order for this transfer to be successful and not result in a return to a situation similar to the era prior to the U.S. invasion. Given the limited timeframe available to the U.S. and coalition forces to develop the Afghan security apparatus, it is paramount that military personnel assigned advisory duties execute their tasks efficiently and effectively. Failure to adapt to the realities of training military personnel who are ethnically fractured, permeated with corruption, and embedded with social systems wholly foreign to most U.S. personnel, could have catastrophic results for the Afghan people. Additionally, the U.S. military has a long history of advising and

building foreign militaries with which to draw upon. It is vital that best practices and lessons learned be applied whenever feasible in order to prevent replaying history's mistakes.

U.S. advisory efforts within Afghanistan today have benefitted from a long history of U.S. foreign security assistance. Yet, U.S. personnel and their allies have room for increased efficiency and effectiveness. For example, efforts to prepare advisors assigned in Afghanistan to overcome language barriers have improved compared to their predecessors assigned during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. This is not to assert that current language training is adequate or sufficient, but merely represents an improvement. This thesis illustrates the level at which language barriers present an obstacle to operational effectiveness. Additionally, training for personnel assigned advisory duties prior to their arrival in theater have improved compared to prior conflicts. Tour length and personnel turnover rates are an important factor that significantly affects advisors engaged in security assistance operations. Specifically, short tour lengths that promote frequent turnover in personnel have historically detracted from the overall ability of U.S. advisors to fully complete their assigned objective. Cultural awareness and efforts to prepare a military advisor for interacting in a foreign environment are essential to the establishment of good rapport and professionalism between military counterparts. Conflicting policies that divert resources and prevent a unified chain of command can have drastic effects on the advisory mission.

The above factors individually influence the ability of a military advisor to carry out their assigned duties within security assistance operations. However, these variables are also inherently connected through the interpersonal nature of the advisor/advisee relationship. Together they can compound obstacles to mission success. For example, an officer with substantial language proficiency in the local dialect for the region in which he is assigned will likely overcome insufficient training over time. However, the time period in which that officer is learning and adapting to the operational environment detracts from his overall effectiveness during his tour. Thus, an officer assigned a relatively short one-year tour, spends a significant portion of that tour operating at a

diminished capacity. Another officer, one that lacks sufficient language proficiency, would obviously experience even more difficulty.

This research is aimed at yielding an unbiased critique of U.S. and allied efforts to build the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) during the transition from Taliban rule to self-sustaining democratic rule by the Afghan people. Such a critique may be applied to on-going efforts in Afghanistan, as well as to other post-conflict security sector reform initiatives in the region. The U.S. has taken part in advising indigenous forces in numerous countries and various capacities that provide ample comparison of successes and failures. A comparative study of the role of U.S. advisors in major operations of the 20th century will highlight the key variables that either facilitates increased operability and operational success or relative failure with direct application to the on-going effort in Afghanistan.

There is a wealth of literature available regarding security assistance operations and specifically military advising. However, there currently is no study that applies this literature specifically to the war in Afghanistan. This study will answer numerous important questions such as: are we advising effectively; how do we measure effectiveness; are we learning from our mistakes? While I do not believe there to be a silver-bullet that will miraculously enable the ANSF to become self-sufficient, I do believe that critical analysis can yield areas for improvement.

C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is based on systematic case studies of the role of advisors in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and identifies key variables that may be applied to the war in Afghanistan. By identifying these variables' significance in their respective conflicts, the degree to which they apply to contemporary operations in Afghanistan can be evaluated. What worked in previous operations may not be applicable to the realities of Afghanistan, but a path to improvement lies within evaluating the lessons of the past so as not to continually re-fight the last war and remake the same mistakes.

The present advisory situation in Afghanistan will be systematically compared to two previous cases of U.S. advisory operations. Korea and Vietnam provide exceptional

case studies for the purpose of identifying the key variables related to advisors engaged in U.S. security assistance. The Korean War was the first major operation in which U.S. forces engaged in advisory operations after becoming the world's preeminent military power following the end of World War II. In Korea, U.S. advisors trained inexperienced, regular and conscript forces in conventional warfare, in order to mitigate the effects of North Korean aggression. The Vietnam War was the largest and longest combat advisory operation (aside from Afghanistan) of the 20th century and involved training both experienced and inexperienced personnel in both conventional and unconventional styles of warfare. Each of these case studies involves the common thread of U.S. military advisors. When systematically compared, these case studies will provide a detailed depiction of U.S. advisory duties throughout the 20th century.

Dr. Martin Loicano, Political Military Analyst for NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A), maintains a substantial database of raw data, reports and briefings from numerous sources within Afghanistan, which he has made available for my research. In addition to first-person accounts from those assigned advisory duties as available, I draw upon the multitude of data provided by the Military History Institute and the Center Army Lessons Learned at Leavenworth. I limit my critique of the war in Afghanistan to the fall of 2003 through the present. In the fall of 2003, the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) was created, and represented a doctrinal shift in the region to counterinsurgency requiring stronger coordination between Coalition and Afghan forces.[4] Coalition operations prior to 2003, focused more specifically on eliminating Al Qaeda elements and the Taliban groups supporting them who were operating within Afghanistan as opposed to counterinsurgency. This doctrinal shift placed significant emphasis on building the capacity of the Afghan government to provide for its own security and thus provides the best opportunity to evaluate security assistance within that capacity.

[4] Donald P. Wright. *A different kind of war: the United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), October 2001-September 2005*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2010). 237

In order to evaluate the vital factors that significantly influence the effectiveness of military advisors within the context of each case study, I will employ a seven-point Likert Scale to illustrate the extent to which each factor influenced (positively or negatively) advisory operations. The Likert Scale provides the ability to equally distribute perceptions of agreement or disagreement on subjective material.[5] The vital factors that are discussed within this thesis are inherently subjective in nature, making their quantification for analysis problematic. By utilizing the Likert Scale, it is possible to systematically quantify, in an ordinal manner, the frequency that each of the vital factors influenced advisory operations (Table 1). The conclusion of each case study includes a table, utilizing the Likert Scale, to illustrate the influence of the vital factors based on the historical narrative developed through my research. Chapter V provides a comparison of this data.

Code	Occurrence	Percentage
1	Never	0%
2	Rarely	~10%
3	Occasionally	~30%
4	Sometimes	~50%
5	Frequently	~70%
6	Usually	~90%
7	Always	100%

Table 1. Likert Scale

D. THESIS CONTENT

This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I introduces the topic and explains its significance within the larger field of security assistance operations. Chapter II provides background information on security assistance operations and the role of advisors. Additionally, Chapter II contains a literature review of the most prominent literature regarding advisors engaged in security assistance operations, and is the basis for the influential variables that are highlighted within this research. Chapter III includes the systematic case studies of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts involving U.S. security

[5] Elaine Allen and Christopher Seaman. "Statistics Roundtable: Likert Scales and Data Analyses". *Quality Progress*, Vol. 40, No. 7, July 2007. 64–65.

assistance operations, and highlighting the key variables affecting military advisors. Chapter IV will critique Afghan security assistance operations based on the key variables and findings developed in Chapter III. Chapter V provides a contrast and comparison of Afghanistan and the systematic case study. Chapter VI contains the conclusion and policy recommendations based on the application of the systematic case study.

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II. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

A. WHAT ARE SECURITY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS?

The term Security Assistance Operations refers to a wide field of both military and political actions that a state pursues in accordance with their respective security policy goals. It is sometimes rather difficult to formulate a specific, yet generalizable definition of what does and does not fit within the realm of Security Assistance Operations, given the wide range of operations, policies and other actions a state might undertake as a matter of international policy. Joint Publication 1-02 defines security assistance as,

> Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.[6]

The term security cooperation is defined as,

> All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.[7]

Clearly, security cooperation is a subset within the large group of programs termed security assistance. This thesis is primarily focused on the role of the military advisor within the field of security cooperation. Military advisors are specifically affected or influenced by security assistance programs, such as weapons procurement programs of their indigenous counterparts. Ultimately, the goal of advisors as defined above is to contribute to the development of the partner nation's military forces the capacity for self-

[6] Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms*. (2010). http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS14106. 302.

[7] Ibid. 303.

defense within their borders and interoperability with U.S .and allied forces in multinational operations, as well as providing for U.S. access to critical forward areas within their borders.

Security assistance operations, inclusive of security assistance and security cooperation, constitute a substantial portion of the United States' annual federal budget. They have become a benchmark of the United States' foreign policy and have significantly contributed to the numerous friendly relationships developed over time with its foreign allies. Efficient and effective security assistance operations are heavily reliant on the personnel assigned within them to carry out day-to-day operations and promote beneficial interpersonal relationships with their foreign counterparts. By analyzing the personnel assigned to these units, specifically military advisors, it is possible to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system to promote increased efficiency and effectiveness in future security assistance endeavors.

B. VITAL FACTORS INFLUENCING MILITARY ADVISORS

1. Language Proficiency

The ability of a military advisor to effectively communicate with his indigenous counterpart is vital to the success of his assigned mission. Inadequate language proficiency leads to an over-reliance on interpreters for communication. While interpreters have historically enabled military advisors to overcome the language barrier, the use of interpreters itself creates an environment devoid of true interpersonal understanding between an advisor and his indigenous counterpart. True interpersonal communication, such as that between persons communicating in a shared language, conveys subtle, yet important information such as tone and idiom that are often omitted during interpretation or literal translation. Additionally, the introduction of a third person presents a barrier to frank and honest communication between the advisor and his counterpart.

In cases where the interpreter is not a military professional the prevalence of highly technical and specialized terminology within the military vernacular further inhibits an interpreter's ability to convey the message, particularly where no equivalent exists within the indigenous language.

2. Cultural Training

In addition to an advisor's ability to communicate effectively it is vital that he possess a well-developed understanding of the culture and history of the environment within which he is assigned. Such an understanding is only achieved through specific and directed study of the region that imparts on that advisor an awareness of the cultural norms and values that exist among the people who inhabit the region. Failure to achieve this cultural understanding, presents a significant challenge to the military advisor in developing a professional and genial rapport with his counterpart. While often it is the mission of the advisor to develop indigenous military capability to mirror or at least compliment U.S. military capabilities, it is vitally important to recognize that U.S. culture is often radically different from that of his counterpart's culture. Historically, the most effective military advisors are those who successfully employed their cultural awareness to adapt their communication and training methods to the local environment without necessarily sacrificing local norms and values.

3. Tour Length

The length of a military advisor's tour of duty within the assigned region, directly affects his ability to achieve success in his assigned mission. A tour of duty that is too short in duration inhibits the development of rapport as one advisor is constantly replaced with another, while the indigenous counterpart typically remains constant. Additionally, as with any military rotation cycle, there exists a transitionary period in which a newly reported advisor is adapting to the local environment, and learning the basic fundamentals of his assignment. During this transition, the advisor who is being relieved (if he has not already departed) is likely more focused on turnover with his relief rather

than interaction with his indigenous counterpart. For example, advisors who are assigned to a one year tour of duty will likely spend one to two months at the beginning and end of their tours engaged in transition rather effective advising.

4. Advisor Selection and Training

One of the most important factors influencing the effectiveness of a military advisor, is what type of officer is selected for an advisory assignment, and what type of training, if any, they receive prior to reporting in theater. Historically, priority of assignments for the best American personnel has been to operational units, particularly during times of active combat operations. The most experienced officers and senior enlisted personnel were assigned to U.S. units, rather than in advisory positions working with foreign militaries. Specific emphasis on the quality and background of personnel assigned to advisory duties during the selection process was rare. Rather, personnel were often assigned advisory duties on an ad hoc basis, which significantly impaired ability of the command responsible for security cooperation and assistance to achieve mission success. Additionally, personnel selected for advisory duties received little to no specific training for the job they would be assigned.

5. Governing Policy

The security policy that governs the advisory mission significantly influences an advisor's effectiveness. Narrowly assigned objectives or the ambiguity of a desired end state often limit resources available to an advisor, such as budgets or equipment. Historically, military advisors initiate advisory operations under very limited policy goals, which are only gradually expanded as events unfold, such as escalation of violence in the region. Insufficient emphasis placed on the importance of the advisor's overall mission of developing friendly military capability within the assigned region, creates significant structural challenges. Weak governing policy can create ambiguous command relationships between the advisory command, and parent organizations, which in turn negatively influences allocation of resources and operational priorities.

6. Indigenous Forces Training

The primary function of security cooperation operations is the development of friendly military forces' self-defense capability and capacity to take part in joint operations with U.S. forces. Inherent in this process is the requirement of foreign military personnel to efficiently and effectively understand and adopt U.S. military tactics, technology and procedures. Historically, one of the most effective methods in imparting U.S. military doctrine on foreign military personnel is through their attendance of U.S. military educational and training programs. As the global leader in military technology and operations post-World War II, the United States maintains the premier capacity for the development of military professionals at all levels, from the most junior personnel to Flag and General officers. Attendance by foreign military personnel at U.S. military training facilities is highly competitive given the limited quotas available to non-U.S. personnel. This typically results in only the most highly qualified and career oriented personnel from foreign militaries being sent to the U.S. Upon their return to their respective parent organizations, these U.S. trained personnel are uniquely qualified to aid U.S. advisory personnel in the development of their organization's military capabilities. Additionally, having spent a significant amount of time living in the United States and interacting with English-speaking personnel both on and off duty, these personnel can help bridge the language barrier throughout the advisory process.

7. Financial Dependency

Closely associated with security cooperation operations are security assistance operations that provide partner nations with defense articles and training through grant, loan, credit or cash sales programs. Security assistance enables partner nations to reform and modernize their security apparatus more rapidly and efficiently than if they had to rely solely on financing internal to their borders. Additionally, these programs provide access to defense articles of U.S. origin to partner nations, which enables U.S. advisors to better train their indigenous counterparts through the utilization of equipment and systems, of which they already intimately familiar with. An unfortunate consequence of

the security assistance program, historically, has been the development of dependency on foreign financial aid of the partner nation. In many cases, the partner nation's capacity to sustain a security apparatus that has received substantial security assistance within the confines of their defense budget is severely limited. The results can be drastic. Advanced defense articles received from the U.S. often degrade rapidly as the state cannot afford the expensive maintenance and training requirements necessary to keep these articles in battle-ready conditions. Without substantial economic reforms coinciding with security cooperation and security assistance, these partner nations simply are unable to afford the security apparatus that was created during the partnership. This economic tie may be beneficial for furthering U.S. interests in the region, but may also entail destabilization effects, should the U.S. attempt to roll back security assistance programs.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

A multitude of literature exists regarding numerous facets of military advisory duties ranging from Lawrence of Arabia's "Twenty-Seven Articles"[8] to contemporary policy and doctrine publications related to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and counterinsurgency (COIN), which represent the latest evolutions of warfare. Security assistance operations have become an essential element in the way the United States conducts its foreign and security policies. For example, the latest Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* states,

[8] T.E Lawrence. "Twenty-Seven Articles," *The Arab Bulletin,* 27 August 1917, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_27_Articles_of_T.E._Lawrence

> Within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic in the coming years will be Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions: "hands on" efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries' forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories. In order to ensure that improvements in partner security forces are sustained, the Department must seek to enhance the capabilities and capacity of security institutions, such as defense ministries, that support fielded forces.[9]

Military advisors are inherently vital to this process, and as such, their training, duties, and conduct should be carefully analyzed. It is then necessary to answer the question, how does the U.S. military advise indigenous military forces? Furthermore, are advisors, who are engaged in security assistance operations in Afghanistan, effective when compared to the extensive history of U.S. military assistance to foreign nations? It is then important to review the available literature on the topic of military advisors in order to ascertain the most prominent areas of consensus and dispute.

Key variables influencing effectiveness of military advisors are readily apparent within the body of literature that concerns U.S. security assistance operations. The most important variable identified within the literature is rapport. Rapport is defined as, "a close and harmonious relationship in which the people or groups concerned understand each other's feelings or ideas and communicate well."[10] Within the context of advisory duties, no single factor is more crucial than the development of rapport. The development of rapport between an advisor and his advisee is reliant on several other factors, which will be mentioned below, and ultimately determine, in large part, the degree to which an advisor is effective in his assigned duties.

Language proficiency, meaning an advisor's ability to effectively communicate with their indigenous counterparts, is another key variable affecting advisors. A working knowledge of the local dialect, particularly with regard to professional and technical terminology, is vital to communication between the advisor and all indigenous personnel they come into contact with. Lastly, allocation of personnel to be assigned advisory

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[9] Dept. of Defense. *Quadrennial defense review report*. (2010). 26

[10] New Oxford American Dictionary 2nd edition. 2005. Oxford University Press, Inc.

duties to include: who is assigned, how they are prepared, and how long their tour of duty will be, greatly influences the advisory duties. Historically, this factor has substantially diminished overall effectiveness of military advisors, despite the fact that it is perhaps the easiest to manipulate through improved pre-assignment advisor training and increased tour lengths.

Any serious discussion regarding the role of military advisors should begin with perhaps the most famous of advisors, Lawrence of Arabia. T. E. Lawrence wrote,

> Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.[11]

Lawrence was writing specifically about his experiences as an advisor and liaison during the Arab revolt against Ottoman-Turkish rule from 1916–1918. However, his comments may still be applied to advisory duties in other regions despite the obviously significant cultural differences between Arabs and other nations. In his review of U.S. military assistance to military forces in Korea, Vietnam and El Salvador, Robert D. Ramsey III notes,

> Not understanding the local cultural issues, the host-nations military institutional norms and procedures, and the specifics of local conditions, most advisors frequently misunderstood important things. This undercut rapport and increased the frustration and strain between the advisor and his counterpart.[12]

In *The U.S. Advisor*, of the Indochina Monographs Series, the authors state,

> How to get along with a Vietnamese counterpart and have him receptive required the whole art of human relations and depended on how well the U.S. adviser knew the Vietnamese character and temperament.[13]

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[11] T.E. Lawrence, "Twenty-Seven Articles"

[12] Robert D. Ramsey. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). 111

[13] Van Vien Cao. *The U.S. adviser*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980). 196

As a whole, the authors were rather positive on the degree to which U.S. advisors were able to achieve such a high level of rapport. What makes such a claim particularly interesting is that the authors of *The U.S. Advisor* were comprised of a group of former Republic of Vietnam senior military officers, who were writing subsequent to the U.S. departure from Vietnam. They had little reason to be overly complimentary of U.S. personnel, and yet they conclude, "they [U.S. advisors] invariably came away with profound compassion and a heart felt affection for their counterparts…"[14] Clearly, the development of a rapport that facilitated mutual understanding and communication was vital to the overall success of the advisory mission in Vietnam. Therefore, in order to maximize the effectiveness of advisors it is essential that every effort be made to develop adequate rapport between the advisor and advisee. While there is no universal formula that applies equally across all cultural and political boundaries, the literature shows that those personnel who established rapport with their counterpart did so through determined professionalism, language proficiency, and experience.

The existence of a language barrier is perhaps the most prominent obstacle present in the advisory process. It can create a situation in which advisors are essentially deaf and blind, unable to understand what is being said around them, and unable to comprehend what was going on around them.[15] This is particularly acute in a region such as Afghanistan where ethno-linguistic factionalization is prevalent throughout the country. At least 40 distinct languages are spoken within Afghanistan with numerous local dialects that create a situation in which a tribe may speak a dialect that is mutually unintelligible to another tribe that resides on the other side of an adjacent mountain. In *Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present,* author Robert D. Ramsey III includes 14 readings all produced by people with first-hand experience in the field of military advising.[16] Each reading places specific emphasis on the importance of bridging the language barrier. Within these remarks are phrases such

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[14] Ibid. 198

[15] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. 110–111

[16] Robert D. Ramsey. *Advice for advisors: suggestions and observations from Lawrence to the present*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

as, "…even a little knowledge of the language impresses and pleases…"[17] or "…single most important factor in breaking down cultural barriers…"[18] are prevalent throughout. This emphasis on language by former advisors demonstrates the vital importance of language proficiency. During the Korean War,

> Advisors who did not know or try to learn the Korean language expressed greater difficulty, more frequent frustrations, and a stronger dislike for their advisory assignment than those who attempted to learn some Korean.[19]

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, also places specific emphasis on the necessity of having language proficiency within the force as means of increasing combat effectiveness and operational success.[20] These are simply a few examples within the body of available literature that uphold the value of bridging the language barrier during advisory operations.

While it is true that language proficiency is exceedingly desirable given the aforementioned examples, it is also true that the language barrier is rarely, if ever fully overcome during advisory duties. This raises the question, if language proficiency is so important, how have prior operations met their objectives without sufficient language proficiency? Only a very small percentage of U.S. advisors in Vietnam ever reached even a limited level of proficiency in the local language.[21] This can be attributed to the high level of difficulty associated with learning the highly tonal language compounded by the lack of military of technical terminology within the Vietnamese language.[22] It follows that it was simply more expedient for the indigenous forces to learn English rather than U.S. forces attempt even rudimentary proficiency in Vietnamese. Similarly, during the Korean War, "thousands of illiterate Koreans could learn English better and

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[17] Ibid. 122

[18] ibid. 124

[19] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.* 16

[20] Dept. of the Army. *Counterinsurgency*. (2006). http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf.

[21] Van Vien Cao. 1980. 195

[22] Ibid.

faster than educated Americans could learn Korean."[23] It would seem that while there is relative agreement on the utility of language proficiency, the inherent difficulties in developing adequate language proficiency preclude its implementation on a force-wide scale.

Prevalent throughout the body of available literature on advisory operations is the issue of adequate manning. Manning applies to who gets assigned advisory duties, how many personnel are assigned, and how long of tour they serve. Based on the review of literature, there is a general consensus that manning was often inadequate given the assigned objectives. Tours in Afghanistan for personnel who are assigned advisory duties are typically one year to 18-month deployments, and gapped billets are routine. As of June 2011, more than 1,500 personnel from 33 nations were training and advising the ANSF, yet this number leaves a short- fall of 490 personnel.[24]

The Korean War provides examples of insufficient advisor manning. According to Ramsey, often the advisors assigned at the company and field-grade level were well motivated, but lacked the professional acumen to properly fulfill their duties.[25] He attributes this to the fact that in the assignment of U.S. personnel, priority was given to assigning the best officers to command units engaged in the combat operations of the war, rather than those tasked with reforming the South Korean military.[26] Furthermore, he notes, "Getting worthless advisors relieved was easy. Poor advisors presented a greater problem."[27] This trend continued during the Vietnam War. According to Ramsey, "Frequently, a young U.S. Army First Lieutenant, with two years of service and no combat experience became the advisor overseeing a commander twice his age, and who

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[23] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. 15

[24] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 2010. *Quarterly report to the United States Congress*. Second Quarter. 56

[25] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. 11

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid. 12

had 25 years of combat experience."[28] This presents a problem, as according to Michael J. Metrinko,

> Rank is real, whether earned or bestowed as a gift. Rows of medals carry weight in foreign eyes, and until proven otherwise, ribbons, medals, and insignia connote gravitas, intelligence, expertise, entrée, and authority.[29]

Additionally, despite specific emphasis on pacification efforts that required significant manpower, in 1968 Military Assistance Command—Vietnam had 2,500 fewer advisors than authorized under the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) system.[30] Van Vien Cao notes,

> From the beginning to the end of the U.S. advisory effort, the RVNAF never requested a specific quota of advisors nor were they ever able to determine completely what types of advisors were required for their own needs.[31]

Thus, a situation was created where manpower shortages, and personnel assignment deficiencies, on the part of U.S. forces, were exacerbated by the indigenous military's inability to provide input to the process.

Short tour lengths of personnel assigned advisory duties have routinely been a significant obstacle to effective advisory operations. Specifically, personnel are routinely assigned advisory duties for one year tours, meaning they are not effective for four to six months after arriving, given the time required to acclimatize to their specific assignment. The process then repeats itself upon that individual's subsequent relief.[32] Meanwhile, the indigenous military counterparts to these advisors remain relatively constant and are forced to endure this cycle. Such a situation cannot foster adequate rapport between the

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[28] Ibid. 33

[29] Michael J. Metrinko. *The American military advisor dealing with senior foreign officials in the Islamic world*. (Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, Pa. 2008). http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS106302.

[30] Van Vien Cao. 1980. 8

[31] Ibid. 17

[32] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.* 90

advisor and his indigenous counterpart given their short and possibly strained relationship.

D. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the available body of literature, it is possible to identify key areas of consensus and dispute. The available literature demonstrates a particular emphasis on the importance of positive rapport between the military advisor and his indigenous counterpart. A strong working relationship founded on mutual trust and respect is vital to operational success. Failure to develop adequate rapport has proved detrimental to advisory efforts and detracted from the completion of assigned objectives. The language barrier inherent to advising foreign military forces presents a significant barrier to operational success. High levels of language proficiency can significantly improve advisors' chances of success; however, history shows that often it is more practical for the indigenous forces to develop English proficiency rather than U.S. advisors developing local proficiency. The cultural training an advisor receives prior to arriving in a country for duty, if any, has a significant impact on that advisors' understanding of the socioeconomic nuances that permeate local society. The determination of what type of personnel are assigned as advisors, with respect to experience level, adaptability, upward mobility, etc., affects the overall effectiveness of an advisory unit given the specific personnel that make up its ranks. How U.S. forces are allocated to serve in advisory efforts greatly influences the achievement of their assigned tasks. Short tour lengths and under-qualified personnel pose a significant obstacle. The training programs, both internal and external to the partner nation, that aid in the development of indigenous military personnel can either greatly aid or detract from the advisory effort. Finally, fiscal dependency that develops as a result of substantial security assistance in post-conflict and/or developing regions significantly impacts advisory operations with respect to the long-term self-sufficiency of indigenous military forces.

I believe these themes when applied to the Korea and Vietnam case studies, as well as current operations in Afghanistan, will provide an effective critique of our advisory role and help gauge the effectiveness of our advisors (Table 2).

	Language Proficiency	**Cultural Training**	**Tour Length**	**Advisor Selection & Training**	**Governing Policy**	**Indigenous Forces Training**	**Fiscal Dependency**
Korea							
Vietnam							
Afghanistan							

Table 2. Vital Factors Influencing Advisory Operations

III. SYSTEMATIC CASE STUDIES

A. INTRODUCTION

A review of U.S. operations within the Korean and Vietnam Wars provides substantial insight into the activities and responsibilities of military advisors engaged in security cooperation operations. This chapter systematically reviews the historical record of military advisors in Korea and Vietnam, while highlighting the vital factors that influence an advisor's effectiveness. These vital factors, as previously discussed, have a dramatic effect on an advisor's ability to successfully complete their assigned mission. The degree to which each of these vital factors resulted in a positive or negative situation when viewed in hindsight provides an argument for their consideration in modern military conflicts. The following chapter, which critiques advisory operations in the modern conflict within Afghanistan, will be evaluated on the basis of the vital factors identified within Korea and Vietnam.

B. KOREA

U.S. Advisory efforts in Korea began in September 1945 following the Japanese surrender and rapid collapse of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). American units arrived on the peninsula in the form of occupation troops, who were rapidly deployed to the region in order to maintain security during the repatriation of Japanese nationals and subsequent reconstruction of a sovereign Korean state. Simultaneously, military units from the USSR moved south from Manchuria into the Northern Peninsula to perform the same function in the areas north of the 38th Parallel. This hastily made arrangement between the United States and the Soviets resulted in a situation where American units were chosen more for their expediency of deployment to the region, rather than any specific knowledge of the terrain or culture. Korea presents an exceptional case study in the United State's first large scale security cooperation endeavor.

The inherent challenges ahead for American forces that would be tasked with developing the capability for Korean military forces to provide for their own self-defense and eventual participation in allied operations were daunting.

The task of creating a self-sufficient military apparatus in Korea was daunting given the relatively small contingent of Korea nationals with sufficient levels of military expertise. Additionally, there was significant disdain among Koreans for anyone who had played a role in the Japanese colonization of the peninsula, which implicated a majority of the experienced Korean military community. Specifically, initial attempts by United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) to retain Japanese officials at various levels of government by virtue of their experience in order to expedite stabilization and reconstruction were met with significant opposition by the Koreans. Considering the harsh, often barbaric, treatment of the Koreans by the Japanese during previous decades, it is understandable in hindsight that Koreans would not accept Japanese involvement in their government even on a temporary basis.[33] Thus, U.S. officials would need to come up with an alternate course of action that could overcome the lack of Korean experience, while still managing to produce results within a limited time frame.

U.S. Army Forces in Korea's (USAFIK) Commanding General, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge assigned brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick, Provost Marshal General, XXIV Corps, the task of developing a Korean police agency. Under Schick, a study would be completed by U.S. military personnel to develop a recommendation for make-up of the Korean national defense forces. Ultimately, the study recommended a 25,000 man police force, later to be expanded and redesignated a constabulary, as well as Army and Air Force units totaling 45,000 men, with Navy and Coast Guard limited to 5,000 men.[34] These numbers would fluctuate in reaction to the course of events unfolding on the peninsula preceding the breakout of active war, causing advisors to continually reevaluate their methods in order to meet the requirements.

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[33] Robert K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes. *Military advisors in Korea: KMAG in peace and war*. (Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1962). 7.

[34] Ibid. 7–10.

On August 15, 1948, the USAMGIK officially transferred authority to President Rhee and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government. The transition from military to civilian control of the government necessitated a significant realignment of U.S. forces, which resulted in all advisory personnel being assigned to Provincial Military Advisory Group (PMAG) under the command of Brigadier General William L. Roberts.[35] During the remainder of the year, PMAG would expand in size though, lacking clearly defined official policy regarding its advisory role, PMAG would initially struggle to make a significant impact in building Korean security capacity.[36] In time, Roberts would further develop the role of PMAG and institute policies that would significantly expand the effectiveness of its advisors. Chief among Roberts's policies was the development of his "counterpart system." The counterpart system matched American military advisors with Korean counterparts at each level of command, battalion through division, in order to develop sufficient rapport between U.S. and Korean personnel such that effective training and increased capability could be achieved.[37] This policy is notable in that it represented a determined effort to assign experienced advisors who could overcome challenges associated with an environment of differing cultures, languages and perceptions. Specifically, Roberts instructed his personnel that, "Advisors do not command—they ADVISE" and that they should not attempt to "convert the Korean into an American."[38] U.S. advisors would face many challenges in attempting to carry out Roberts' orders.

On July 1, 1949, PMAG was reorganized and expanded to an authorized 500 personnel as the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG). Like PMAG, KMAG operated under the mandate of developing the Korean military through advising and assistance within the limits of the Korean economy.[39] Roberts retained command despite the reorganization and name change.

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[35] Ibid. 35.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Donald J. Stoker. *Military advising and assistance: from mercenaries to privatization, 1815-2007*. (London: Routledge, 2008). 89.

[38] Office of the Chief of KMAG, *Advisor's Handbook*, (17 October 1949, Mowitz Papers, USAMHI). 2.

[39] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces: American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. 5.

His ultimate goal would be to ensure that all those under his command could overcome the numerous challenges they would face in building the Korean Military.

A significant challenge faced by Roberts was the type of personnel, particularly with respect to officers, that were being assigned advisory positions within KMAG. Roberts received an influx of newly commissioned lieutenants without combat experience.[40] Assignment to KMAG was not viewed as a desirable assignment, or one that would ensure upward mobility for future promotions. In fact, anyone with the required military occupational specialty (MOS) and the need for an overseas tour could be selected for assignment to KMAG.[41] They would be assuming an advisory role despite their obvious lack of specialized training, experience, or specific knowledge of the operational environment. It was not uncommon for basic infantry officers to be assigned as the senior advisor to cavalry, mechanized or armored units, assignments for which they had never previously received standardized training in or had operational experience in any capacity. Priority of assignments during this time went to U.S. operational units, meaning the best trained and most experienced personnel resided outside of KMAG in units with combat operations in their charter.[42] Yet the young officers of KMAG were expected to overcome such challenges through professionalism, perseverance and initiative.

KMAG advisors faced a major language barrier between themselves and their Korean counterparts. Throughout the entire conflict, very few U.S. personnel ever developed sufficient enough fluency in Korean to effectively communicate with Korean personnel. This language barrier placed a premium on English-speaking Koreans who could act as interpreters. Further compounding this problem, was the significant lack of technical and military terminology within the Korean language to the extent that interpreters often struggled to communicate the true meaning of the message the American advisors were trying to convey. For example, words such as “machine-gun” or

[40] Donald J. Stoker. 2008. 94.

[41] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.* 11.

[42] Ibid. 12.

"phase-line" had no equivalent in Korean and had to be physically acted out to impart their meaning. Spark plugs, which were clearly a vital component of the numerous vehicles being assigned to Korean units, were state of the art technology and were referred to as "bolts that spit fire."[43] The lack of printed materials in Korean slowed training efforts as well, necessitating rudimentary operations such as weapons cleaning and basic field operations to be physically demonstrated so the Koreans could learn by rote.[44] Thus the interpreter became an indispensible companion to the U.S. advisor throughout the entire scope of operations on the peninsula.

In addition to the language barrier U.S. advisors had to overcome a significant disparity between their own cultural norms and values and those of their Korean counterpart. Cultural issues manifested themselves in various ways throughout the conflict and forced adaptation by both U.S. and Korean personnel if any effective training was to be achieved. U.S. advisors arriving for duty in Korea, and having received no specific training on Korean culture were at a significant disadvantage. Advisors quickly discovered that common norms within their own culture, such as military protocol, were not necessarily mirrored by their Korean counterparts. Flexibility, adaptation and professionalism by the U.S. advisor would become vital to the success of the advisory mission.

The cultural aspect of "face", or one's pride, self-respect or vanity, was particularly sensitive to advisory operations and had to be carefully taken into account when dealing with Korean personnel. An advisor risked embarrassing his counterpart, and thus damaging rapport, should he fail to consider the perception of face in his conduct with his counterpart. Additionally, advisors found their counterparts often reluctant to accept advice, or carry out actions that could result in a loss of face. Specifically, instances of Korean officers "refusing to change or modify orders, lest their original judgment be suspected of being wrong" were reported.[45] Thus it became vital that for any criticism to be effective, it occur in a private discussion, rather than in a

[43] Donald J. Stoker. 2008. 95.

[44] Ibid. 96.

[45] Donald J. Stoker. 2008. 98.

forum where superiors or subordinates might observe.[46] These informal "hooch" conversations—in contrast to the formal headquarters conversations—aided the development of rapport by imparting knowledge without sacrificing face.[47] Such an accommodation was particularly important in cases where an advisor's counterpart was of superior rank or significantly older; which was often the case.

Formal and informal policy issues were a constant obstacle to be overcome by advisors in Korea. The KMAG mandate was to develop ROK security forces by advising and assisting Korean military forces and to ensure effective utilization of U.S. security assistance programs. However, U.S. advisors routinely found themselves engaged in combat alongside their Korean counterparts. U.S. combat commanders relied on the ROKA divisions to perform in combat and held the assigned advisor responsible for the success or failure of their units in combat despite the advisor's lack of command authority.[48] This created a situation where an advisor often had to take action that may cause embarrassment, harming his relationship with his counterpart, but perhaps be necessary in order to affect positive results on the battlefield. Ultimately, a high level of rapport between the two would need to be developed so that through mutual understanding and professional respect, effective decisions could be made, particularly in high stress combat environments.

By the summer of 1953, amidst growing concerns over the difficulties being experienced in developing ROK forces, the U.S. Army authorized the Operations Research Office to conduct a survey of the advisory effort. *The KMAG Advisor: Role and Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Arm for Combat Operations in Korea* was published in February 1957 after a draft report was circulated for consideration and comment.[49] While this report specifically addressed many of the challenges faced by U.S. advisors such as language proficiency, preparatory training, and

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[46] Ibid. 99.

[47] Alfred H. Hausrath. *The KMAG Advisor: Role and Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea.* (Chevy Chase: John Hopkins University.1957). 48.

[48] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.* 18.

[49] Ibid. 19

tour length, very few of the recommendations included in the report were ever formally adopted since the war had concluded well before its publication.[50] U.S. forces with the assistance of the ROKA had been successful in breaking the North Korean advance, pushing the front back to the 38th Parallel and allowing for the signing of the Armistice Agreement July 27, 1953. The advisory effort would continue after major combat operations had ceased, but the sense of urgency for improvement of such operations would diminish, commensurate with the de-escalation of combat. Simply put, the advisors had completed their assigned task of developing Korean military capacity, in that ROK forces successfully operated against enemy units, albeit with significant obstacles along the way. Therefore, it was not deemed necessary to continue to devote significant manpower and resources to a system that already worked.

The vital factors influencing military advisors were presented in Chapter II. Utilizing the Likert Scale, discussed in Chapter I, it is possible to systematically quantify——in an ordinal manner—the frequency that each of the vital factors influenced advisory operations (Table 3). Based on the Korea case study, the below factors are coded in accordance with the frequency in which they influenced advisory operations. Recalling the previous discussion of the Likert Scale in Chapter I, the vital factors are coded on an ordinal frequency scale from 1 (Never) to 7 (Always) relative to their influence on advisory operations. All vital factors identified in Chapter II were present in the Korea case study. Most significant of these factors were language proficiency, cultural training and Advisor Selection & Training. These factors created significant challenges for military advisors on a regular basis, and necessitated substantial adaptation to the operational environment for advisors to successfully complete their assigned mission. In retrospect, it is possible to infer from this data that had these factors been better addressed by senior military personnel, such as more robust predeployment training, and more rigorous selection processes for potential advisors, advisory operations in Korea would have been more effective.

[50] Ibid. 23.

	Language Proficiency	Cultural Training	Tour Length	Advisor Selection & Training	Governing Policy	Indigenous Forces Training	Fiscal Dependency
Korea	6	5	4	5	3	4	3

Table 3. Vital Factors Influencing Military Advisors in Korea

1. Conclusion

The Korean War is an exceptional case study of U.S. military advisors who were able to achieve their assigned task of developing military capacity of indigenous forces despite significant obstacles to mission success. Not only were U.S. military advisors thrust into a combat environment, many of whom had fought in the Pacific or European theaters of World War II, but they were also charged with advising a military force that had never previously coordinated with Westernized military units. The Korean language and culture were completely alien to all but a select few advisors assigned duties on the peninsula. These advisors were not chosen for experience in advisory operations or knowledge of the environment in which they would be assigned. Rather, most advisors were selected on the simple basis of availability for an overseas tour and MOS. Additionally, these advisors faced broad and often ambiguous policy objectives that demanded combat effectiveness of Korean forces without the benefit of unity of command or authority among advisory units. Yet, the Korean War is considered largely a successful advisory operation due to the outcome. Through persistence, adaptation and the utmost professionalism of advisors and their indigenous counterparts, sufficient capability for the defense of Korea was developed.

C. VIETNAM

The Vietnam War is the next logical case study for the evaluation of U.S. military advisors engaged in the development of self-sufficient military capability of indigenous military forces. Given the short lapse of time between the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the assumption that lessons learned in the previous conflict would be applied to advisory operations in the subsequent conflict would be logical. However, the following case study will show that many of the key factors that influenced, and hindered advisory operations in Korea, continued to do so in Vietnam. Cultural and language barriers

continued to detract from the interpersonal relationships between an advisor and his indigenous counterpart. Selection and training of advisory personnel exhibited little improvement over the previous conflict. Governing policy created confusion regarding mission priorities and created a convoluted chain of command for advisory personnel. Yet, U.S. military advisors were still expected to adapt and overcome these challenges to create an indigenous military force capable of defending the Government of Vietnam from northern aggression.

U.S. military assistance in Vietnam began in earnest when an economic survey mission, later referred to as the Griffin mission, was dispatched by the State Department in February of 1950.[51] The results of this survey, combined with similar research compiled by the Department of Defense, resulted in the approval of NSC-64 in March of 1950 that established Indochina as a key area for U.S. foreign policy.[52] This officially affirmed the belief that failure to support friendly regimes within the region would likely result in the loss of access and the eventual spread of communism, otherwise known as the "domino effect." U.S. personnel on the ground quickly became fed up with the conduct of the assistance program utilizing the French as intermediaries in the process. In the words of Major General Graves B. Erskine, USMC,

> [the French] haven't won a war since Napoleon, so why listen to a bunch of second raters when they are losing this war. They are going to show down [sic] with me or I'll recommend they don't get a damn penny.[53]

By September 1950, Erskine's recommendations resulted in the establishment of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina. U.S. assistance was significantly limited in achieving its desired effect, largely due to the French maintaining ultimate authority and responsibility for the conduct of the war. The French had no interest in U.S. support of their operations beyond equipment and financing, so U.S. advisors were powerless to correct the numerous inadequacies they were observing. It would require the crushing defeat of French force at Dien Bien Phu, and subsequent 1954

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[51] Ronald H. Spector. *Advice and support: the early years of the United States Army in Vietnam, 1941–1960*. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1985). 105.

[52] Ibid. 107.

[53] Ibid. 112

Geneva accords that resulted in French withdraw from Indochina before U.S. advisors could effectively begin developing indigenous military capability.

Indochina officially became the Military Advisory and Assistance Group, Vietnam (MAAG-V) in 1955. However, due to the Geneva accords of 1954, MAAG-V was limited to only 342 personnel.[54] In February 1956, the State and Defense departments jointly approved a plan to add an additional 350 personnel under the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) in a separate, but subordinate group of MAAG-V in order to not directly violate the terms of the Geneva accords.[55] TERM's primary mission was to coordinate the "recovery and shipment of excess equipment" that remained in theater as a result of U.S. security assistance to the French, but exceeded the logistical capabilities of the small South Vietnamese Army.[56] According to a U.S. Army memorandum, Army logistics personnel estimated a minimum requirement of 2,800 personnel in various technical specialties in order to accomplish the recovery and logistics assistance mission.[57] Such an example is indicative of the difficulties faced when governing policy. In this case, the State Department's strict adherence to the Geneva accords, limited resources that were required for accomplishment of the mission. Additionally, as numbers of U.S. personnel began to increase, the strength of French military officers rapidly decreased, further stretching the already limited resources (Table. 4)[58].

[54] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.* 27.

[55] Ronald H. Spector. 1985. 261

[56] Ibid.

[57] Memo, DCSOPS for CofSA, 14 May 56, sub: U.S. Policy Toward Vietnam; Memo, Director of Opns, DCSOPS, for DCSOPS, 1 Mar 56, sub: Utilization of Additional U.S. Military Personnel for Vietnam in Spector, Ronald H. 1985. 261.

[58] Ronald H. Spector. 1985. 252

Date	U.S. Officers	French Officers
March 1955	68	209
May 1955	121	225
July 1955	124	108
September 1955	125	66
November 1955	142	58
January 1956	149	53
March 1956	189	0

Table 4. TRIM Strength from March 1955 to March 1956

Policy issues detracted from advisor effectiveness throughout the Vietnam conflict. These issues originated from various sources including the U.S. State Department, the Office of the President, as well as from the South Vietnamese Government. Rivalries existed between members of MAAG-V and the State Department's country team bureaucracy, making some military advisors believe the country team was "loaded against the military" and in particular that Ambassador Dunbrow mistrusted their intentions with respect to the conduct of operations within Vietnam.[59] Additionally, MAAG-V was severely limited by the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which placed strict limitations on the number of advisors deployed to Vietnam, the size of Vietnamese forces to be developed, equipment to be allocated, and the "open-ended" support policy for Vietnam that lacked a clearly defined end-state.[60] Furthermore, a 1965 study by the Army Staff entitled "A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam" identified key issues expressed by the over three hundred senior advisors interviewed for the study. The report concluded that the advisory mission lacked "a unified chain of command" and required improvement in "control of direct and indirect American military support, longer tours, and a comprehensive debriefing and evaluation program for departing advisors."[61] This

[59] Ronald H. Spector. 1985. 277

[60] Ibid. 289

[61] Jeffrey J. Clarke. *Advice and support: the final years, 1965–1973*. (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U. S. Army 1988). 64.

conclusion was strikingly similar to the conclusions presented in *The KMAG Advisor,*[62] which was cited in the above Korea case study. The advisors in Vietnam most certainly would have benefitted from the lessons gleaned in the Korean War being applied to governing doctrine rather than constantly reliving the same mistakes.

Language training and proficiency of advisors assigned in Vietnam did not represent a significant improvement over their predecessors in Korea. The language barrier between Americans and their indigenous counterparts continued to be a daily obstacle to mission completion. Vietnamese language training was made available to U.S. personnel being deployed to the region as part of the Military Assistance Training Advisory (MATA) course of instruction at Fort Bragg. The six-week course included area studies and Vietnamese language training, in addition to practical and technical lessons totaling 217 academic hours.[63] However, the proficiency level of the average American advisor communicating in Vietnamese was well below average at best. One Army advisor remarked, "thousands of Vietnamese learned English…but only a handful of the many thousands of Americans who received language training ever learned to really speak Vietnamese."[64] General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, when discussing U.S. military advisors in the *Indochina Monographs* could recall no instance "in which a U.S. advisor effectively discussed professional matters with his counterpart in Vietnamese."[65] One potential explanation for the lack of language proficiency within the Army was the lack of a single entity or governing body responsible for language training, or the allocation of language trained officers. In fact, "sizable numbers of individuals were trained in languages without subsequently being assigned to jobs that called for their use."[66] Due to the inability of the U.S. military to adequately develop language proficiency, and allocate trained personnel to positions where they

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[62] Alfred H. Hausrath. 1957.

[63] Robert D. Ramsey. 2006. *Advising indigenous forces American advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.* 40.

[64] Stuart A. Herrington. *Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account*. (New York. Ballantine Books 1982). 253.

[65] Van Vien Cao. 1980. 31–32.

[66] Ronald H. Spector. 1985. 288.

would be most effective, U.S. advisors once again became heavily reliant on interpreters and Vietnamese military personnel who could speak English.

American advisors received little training on Vietnamese culture and history both prior to arriving in Vietnam, and upon arrival. Similar to language training, insufficient understanding of the indigenous culture to which an advisor would be assigned was identified as a significant obstacle to mission effectiveness in Korea, yet no doctrinal shift occurred. U.S. advisors in Vietnam arrived just as naïve as their predecessors had several years before. In a 1975 letter to the Chief of Military History, Major General Paul Gorman quoted one of his advisors as stating, "I would have loved to have had an orientation in Vietnamese history…I have no doubt that many people could have been far more effective had they had this background training."[67] It would have been beneficial for an advisor to understand the cultural undertones that permeated Vietnamese society and particularly the South Vietnamese officer corps. Socioeconomic nuances such as family ties, religion, area of origin (such as what part of Vietnam one was from) and source of commission all influenced a Vietnamese officer's conduct.[68] Furthermore, "institutionalized corruption" was commonplace within the South Vietnamese government and military[69], so it was necessary to understand the cultural ties that influenced the system, should an advisor hope to affect positive change without damaging rapport. This is just one example of the numerous informal aspects of the Vietnamese military structure encountered by U.S. advisors. The army's training program as a whole was insufficient in preparing its advisors for the duties they would encounter. As historian Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. notes, "The Army training program for advisors suffered problems from its inception in 1962, the result of a shortage of instructors, time and service motivation."[70] Krepinevich quotes one advisor who stated that he, "learned more about Vietnam and insurgency around the pool of the Rex Hotel in

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[67] Letter, Maj Gen Paul Gorman to Chief of Military History, 1975, sub: Comments on Proposed Monograph: the U.S. Advisor, copy in Historians files, CMH in Ronald H. Spector. 1985. 289.

[68] Jeffrey J. Clarke. 1988. 22.

[69] Ibid. 21.

[70] Andrew F. Krepinevich. *The army and Vietnam*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1986). 207.

Saigon then we ever learned in the states."[71] A study conducted by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) reported that of 605 advisors surveyed; only 194 had completed the MATA course at Fort Bragg, 55 had completed the Military Assistance Programmer Course, and just 37 had completed the Special Warfare Counterinsurgency course.[72] This is indicative of the commonplace underutilization of available courses of instruction due to low level of importance placed on preparatory training by senior military decision-makers of the day. Planners were more focused on putting boots on ground in Vietnam rather than ensuring that the personnel arriving were adequately prepared for their assigned duties.

The rapid turn over of advisory personnel due to the relatively short duration of tour length was a constant irritation to the Vietnamese counterpart. U.S. personnel initially deployed to the region for a tour length of twelve months or six months for operational units, however, tour length for some personnel would be extended to eighteen months later in the war. The continual transition from one advisor to another obviously detracted from rapport, as the Vietnamese personnel remained relatively stable throughout. Historian Ronald H. Spector interviewed one former advisor, who recalled,

> A Vietnamese division commander would have an adviser for eleven months, and then he'd get a new one. The new one would have to start from the zero point again. [The Vietnamese commander] had heard everything before and he knew that the adviser didn't understand the language and that the adviser couldn't be everywhere all the time to see what was going on…He knew all about how to handle advisers.[73]

General Cao Van Vien also expressed his dissatisfaction with constant advisory turnover,

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid. 209–210.

[73] Ronald H. Spector. 1985. 293.

> The good performance of a tactical adviser, however, seemed to depend on a certain continuity and stability of effort devoted to a unit. This would require him to stay at least eighteen months with a unit, but two years would have been better. The one-year tour…did not maintain enough continuity to make the advisory effort as effective as desired…Time was also required for the adviser to demonstrate his abilities, obtain confidence, and to establish his influence within a unit.[74]

Throughout the Vietnam War, there was serious discussion at the highest levels of the U.S. Army staff regarding the extension of tour length, but opposition to the idea of longer tours remained steadfast. Many were concerned about the negative effects of longer tours such as declining morale and increased reliance on the draft. Ultimately, in December 1965, General Westmoreland officially endorsed the twelve-month tour as a general rule due to morale concerns.[75] It would seem that tour length, similar to language and cultural training, was identified as an important factor influencing the advisory mission with the possibility of improving overall effectiveness given the correct change in policy. However, because extending tour length presented various concerns among the senior leadership and the advisory mission took a back seat to combat operations no effective change was ever made.

As presented in the Korea case study, Table 5 illustrates the vital factors coded for the Vietnam case study. Similar to Korea, all of the vital factors identified in Chapter II were present within the Vietnam case study. There was little significant change in the influence of the vital factors when comparing the two case studies. The most notable of the vital factors with respect to the Vietnam case study was the influence of governing policy on military advisors. The available literature shows that this factor impacted daily advisory operations to a greater extent than experienced in the Korean War. The gradual escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam leading to full-scale combat operations did not coincide with significant expansion of advisory operations infrastructure and mandate. Advisors were routinely forced into a combat environment alongside side their Vietnamese counterparts, where they had the responsibility to provide advice and assistance to bring their unit back alive, yet held no official authority to direct the actions

[74] Van Vien Cao. 1980. 70–71.

[75] Jeffrey J. Clarke. 1988. 63.

of Vietnamese units. Vietnamese officers came to rely on U.S. advisors more for their access to U.S. fire-support and logistics, rather than for their advice. In hindsight, had governing policy adequately accounted for the advisory effort, such as a unification of command of all advisory units under a single mandate, the overall effectiveness of advisors in Vietnam may have significantly improved.

	Language Proficiency	**Cultural Training**	**Tour Length**	**Advisor Selection & Training**	**Governing Policy**	**Indigenous Forces Training**	**Fiscal Dependency**
Vietnam	6	4	5	5	5	4	4

Table 5. Vital Factors Influencing Military Advisors in Vietnam

1. Conclusion

The Vietnam War, much like the Korean War before it, was an extremely difficult environment for advisors to operate within due to the several key factors that influenced their effectiveness. The development of rapport between the advisor and his indigenous counterpart was vital to a professional relationship that could promote the increased military capacity of the Government of Vietnam's security forces. Although some formal training programs, such as MATA, were instituted during the Vietnam War to represent a relative improvement over Korea, advisors in Vietnam still received insufficient language and cultural training prior to arrival. Additionally, advisor's suffered from policy issues that never clearly differentiated their role in developing security capacity from that of those U.S. personnel who were actively engaged in combat operations. This resulted in confusing responsibilities and inefficient chains of command, which prolonged the engagement and detracted from the quality of their efforts. As a whole, the advisory mission in Vietnam represented only a slight improvement over Korea, given the multitude of available reports citing avenues of increased efficiency and effectiveness of military advisors following the Korean War.

IV. AFGHANISTAN CRITIQUE

A. BACKGROUND

Following the American military victory over the Taliban government in 2002, the United States, with the aid of its NATO allies and many other members of the international community, initiated efforts to rebuild what would become the fifth attempt at a centrally controlled Afghan Army since the time of Shah Durrani in 1747. The prospect of creating an army that was legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people and that could be adequately manned, trained, equipped and deployed in defense of the Interim Government was daunting. Previous centralized armies under Sher Ali Khan, Abdur Rahman Khan, and later Amanullah Khan, performed their duties with limited success, but all eventually succumbed to imperial pressure and infighting amongst power-hungry tribal leaders. King Nadir Shah was successful in rebuilding a centralized force during the 1930s, though it faced near-collapse again from internal conflict. Only by aligning with the Soviets during the occupation, did the army prevent total collapse. Upon the withdrawal of Soviets, and successive rise to power of regional *Mujahidin* commanders, the Afghan army ceased to exist as a centralized force. Even during the reign of the Taliban, no single centralized military force could claim responsibility for the entire Afghan state. Northern Alliance factions maintained strongholds of fighters throughout the Northern provinces in an attempt to prevent total domination by the Taliban. Despite relative security in the urban centers dominated by the Taliban, no single force had an uncontested claim to the whole of the sovereign Afghan state. Thus the international community, lead by the United States as part of its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), embarked on a task never achieved in the history of Afghanistan; building a self-sufficient centrally-controlled Afghan military.

Significant inherent obstacles to the development of a unified and legitimate military plagued the ruling elite throughout Afghanistan's recent history. Ethno-linguistic fragmentation permeated any sizeable military force with tribal and ethnic bonds often superseding any sense of patriotism or nationalistic duty. Colonialism and international adventurism sought spheres of influence within the ruling elite, creating a

system in which the sacrifice of legitimacy in eyes of some ethno-linguistic factions was necessary in order for rulers to achieve the economic and political power required to defend their regime. In many cases, the massive geographical relocation of hostile tribes was necessary for the rulers of Kabul to bring relative security to the urban centers, leaving rural populations largely outside the influence of the Afghan government. Such relocation practices resulted in a modern Afghanistan that is exceedingly fractured along ethno-linguistic lines with millions of Afghans having lived in refugee camps both inside Afghanistan and in neighboring Iran and Pakistan. Inhabitants of these camps grew to be especially hostile to a centralized government that they felt lacked any sort of legitimacy due to the absence of ethnic representation and prevalent factionalism.

Since 2002, volumes have been published regarding the creation of modern Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).[76] Most authors agree that the development of the Afghan State—to include a national military—was approached as somewhat of an afterthought given that the primary purpose for international intervention in the country was reprisal for those responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks in Washington, D.C. and New York. Serious discussion regarding who should assume control of the power vacuum that was created following the U.S. search and destroy campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban factions that harbored them was not initially a primary concern of the U.S. government. The Bonn Agreement signed December 5th, 2001 outlined the structure of the Interim Government with future milestones aimed at the development of permanent government institutions and legitimate elections.[77] Specific to creation of an Afghan military the Bonn Agreement stated,

[76] See Giustozzi, "Auxiliary Force or National Army: Afghanistan's 'ANA' and the Counter-Insurgency Effort 2002–2006," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 18: 1, 45-67, Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), and Johnson "Refighting the Last War: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Template," with W. Chris Mason, *Military Review*, November-December, 2009, 2-14.

[77] See Thomas H. Johnson, *"Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building after War," Central Asian Survey, (March–June 2006) 25(1–2),* 1–26.

> Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.[78]

Following Bonn, the Afghan government made progress developing the key ministerial infrastructure and human capital required to create an ANSF. However, poor recruiting methods, low pay and ethnic imbalances hindered initial ANSF development efforts.[79]

The U.S. advisory operations began in late 2002 with a Special Forces team being embedded with the ANA Third Battalion, which was the first ANA battalion to be deployed outside of Kabul.[80] Advisory operations by Special Forces units were scrutinized by OEF planners who questioned the dedication of such highly trained units to training Afghans when they could be otherwise engaged in Direct Action (DA) operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Ultimately, the responsibility for advisory operations would shift away from Special Operations forces towards conventional forces. Security force assistance efforts by the United States began in earnest with the opening of an Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) in Kabul under the U.S. Department of State in 2003. The Army's 10th Mountain Division, which arrived in the country in summer 2003, would assume responsibility for advising Afghan security forces. Basic training would occur at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) with Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) being assigned to each of the Afghan Kandaks (battalions) and brigades under the authority of Combined Joint Task Force—Phoenix. Task Force Phoenix also operated Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to augment advisory efforts.

In May 2005, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan was established by CFC-A to oversee the development of the Afghan National Army. CSTC-A was charged with developing training institutions within Afghanistan as well as

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[78] Afghanistan, and UN Talks on Afghanistan. 2001. *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions; and, the 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan.*

[79] Hänggi, Heiner and Bryden, Alan, eds. "Consolidating an Elusive Peace: Afghanistan's Security Sector Reform Process." In *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector.* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004). 207-229.

[80] Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker. *Security force assistance in Afghanistan: identifying lessons for future efforts*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011). 25

managing the embedded training teams and advisors attached to Afghan military units.[81] In October 2009, NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan was created and combined with CSTC-A to oversee all security force assistance operations within Afghanistan. Lieutenant General, William B. Caldwell IV, assumed command of both CSTC-A and NTM-A in a "dual hatted" role on November 21, 2009. Adopting the following mission statement General Caldwell and his staff embarked on a daunting task,

> NTM-A/CSTC-A, in coordination with NATO nations and partners, international organizations, donors and NGOs (non-governmental organizations); supports GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) as it generates and sustains the ANSF (Afghan National Security Force), develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable Afghan-led security."[82]

However, General Caldwell, in "A Letter from the Commanding Officer," admitted,

> There will continue to be leader shortfalls in the Afghan National Army, and some corrupt and inefficient leaders remain in the Army and Police. Attrition also is a constant challenge that undermines professionalization, delays growth, and degrades quality.[83]

Such challenges have existed within the Afghan government since its inception and are not necessarily unique to the security forces. Given the broad mandate to produce a professional, enduring and self-sustaining security force in Afghanistan, CSTC-A has sought to overcome these challenges in order to meet growth and quality milestones and to facilitate an eventual withdrawal of international forces in Afghanistan. Inherent within this process, is the ability of U.S. and NATO military personnel to serve as advisors to their Afghan counterparts in creating a self-sufficient Afghan security force.

B. ADVISORS IN AFGHANISTAN

Analysis of U.S. advisory operations within Afghanistan does not benefit from the decades of scholarly research on the topic, to the extent that the previous Korea and Vietnam case studies do. The Korea and Vietnam case studies benefit from years of

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[81] Ibid. xvi

[82] NTM-A Official Website. Accessed 03/12/11. http://www.ntm-a.com/home

[83] Ibid. 3.

analysis and insight from many of the prominent historians and military theorists as well as hindsight bias resulting from observation of the long-term effects of advisory operations. Advisory operations in Afghanistan are still rather new by comparison making concrete statements about the long-term effects of advisory operations difficult. However, there is significant available literature available to allow for the analysis of Afghan advisory operations in the short-term. Anecdotal accounts published by personnel with first-hand experience of advisory operations in Afghanistan present an accurate portrayal of the challenges faced by U.S. personnel charged with the development of the Afghan security apparatus. Particularly useful are the publications released by RAND's International Security and Defense Policy Center, the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) and various other U.S. government sponsored activities such as the U.S. Army Research Institute For the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Specifically, in December 2008, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences released a technical report entitled *The Human Dimension of Advising: An Analysis of Interpersonal, Linguistic, Cultural, and Advisory Behaviors*[84] that provides substantial data containing 151 behaviors affecting advisory operations. The authors surveyed 565 advisors upon their return from advisory operations in Iraq and Afghanistan between October 2007 and April 2008. The frequency and importance of the 151 identified behaviors is presented within their findings. As a whole, the available literature presents an accurate account of modern advisory operations. The degree to which the aforementioned vital factors influence advisors in contemporary operations is readily apparent utilizing these resources.

As illustrated in the Korea and Vietnam case studies, proficiency of the military advisor in the language spoken by his indigenous counterpart significantly influenced his ability to build rapport with counterpart. It logically follows that the same would be true of advisors deployed to Afghanistan. However, a review of the available literature shows that compared to the other vital factors language proficiency is not as significant to the

[84] Michelle R., Zbylut, Kimberly A. Metcalf, Brandon McGowan, Michael Beemer, Jason M. Brunner, and Christopher L. Vowels. *The Human Dimension of Advising: An Analysis of Interpersonal, Linguistic, Cultural, and Advisory Aspects of the Advisor Role*. (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2009). http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA507713.

overall effectiveness of an advisor as one might assume given the historical model. *The Human Dimension of the Advisor Role* concludes from the authors' analysis that the single most important factor influencing military advisors was the ability to communicate through an interpreter, followed by the establishment of "credibility and trustworthiness" of an interpreter. Intestinally, effective communication in the counterpart's language—other than a few common words—was rated significantly less important (Table 6). [85] Interpreters are substantially more readily available to advisors in Afghanistan than they were to advisors in Korea or Vietnam. Increased availability of interpreters logically leads to greater utilization of interpreters, particularly given the limited language proficiency of U.S. advisors. Thus, as Zbylut et al. conclude, "interpreter usage is critical; if advisors are not proficient in the host nation language, then they must use other means of communicating." Their research further suggests, as does substantial anecdotal evidence, that rudimentary understanding of common words, such as greetings, are helpful in daily interactions with indigenous counterparts leading to increased rapport.[86] It would appear that the Army has finally embraced this concept given its inclusion in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which states, "advisors should learn enough of the language for simple conversation."[87]

Communication Behavior	Mean F-I Composite	Mean Importance Rating	Mean Frequency Rating
Communicate through an interpreter	19.28	4.53	4.17
Understand the capabilities of your interpreter	16.42	4.33	3.60
Conduct a meeting through an interpreter	16.30	4.26	3.61
Evaluate the trustworthiness of your interpreter	16.08	4.40	3.48
Exchange common greetings in your counterpart's language	14.94	3.60	3.54

[85] Ibid. v.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Dept. of Army. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual: U.S. Army field manual no. 3–24: Marine Corps warfighting publication no. 3-33.5*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 6-18.

Communication Behavior	Mean F-I Composite	Mean Importance Rating	Mean Frequency Rating
Understand your interpreter's cultural biases	14.64	4.06	3.35
Understand the background of your interpreter	14.42	4.06	3.32
Read the facial expressions of individuals from your counterpart's culture	14.20	3.64	3.43
Read the facial expressions of individuals from your counterpart's culture	13.89	3.63	3.36
Interpret the gestures of individuals from your counterpart's culture	13.59	3.58	3.30
Speak common words in your counterpart's language	13.52	3.48	3.28
Use gestures commonly found in the host nation's culture	12.77	3.39	3.14
Spend "unstructured time" with your interpreter	12.32	3.43	3.16
Prepare an interpreter for a meeting	11.67	3.58	2.82
Display the body language and posture commonly found in the host nation's culture	9.41	2.84	2.46
Share personal information about yourself with your interpreter	8.93	2.94	2.52
Speak to others in the host nation's language	8.87	3.03	2.33
Prepare one's transition team for a meeting in which an interpreter would be used	8.21	2.90	2.09
Display the facial expressions commonly used by individuals from the host nation	7.39	2.45	2.00
Work with an unfamiliar interpreter	5.17	2.90	2.09
Talk about family in your counterpart's language	3.34	1.83	0.94
Talk about economic issues in your counterpart's language	2.64	1.60	0.77

Communication Behavior	Mean F-I Composite	Mean Importance Rating	Mean Frequency Rating
Talk about tribal issues in your counterpart's language	2.39	1.56	0.69
Work with an interpreter from the local population who has not been vetted	2.29	1.63	0.70
Talk about religion in your counterpart's language	1.78	1.38	0.59
Talk about sports in your counterpart's language	1.72	1.21	0.59
Read the host nation's language	1.68	1.44	0.54
Talk about politics in your counterpart's language	1.24	1.15	0.43
Write in the host nation's language	0.73	1.07	0.26
Importance rating scale: 5—Extremely important, 4—Very important, 3—Moderately important, 2—Some importance, 1—Little importance, 0—None. Frequency ratings: 5—More than once a day, 4—Once a day, 3—Once a week, 2—Once a month, 1—A few times, 0—Did not perform.			

Table 6. Linguistic and Communication Behaviors Ordered by Descending F-I Composite Scores[88]

Similar to language training, the cultural training made available to advisors in Afghanistan has improved by comparison to their predecessors in Korea and Vietnam. This is not to say that there is not substantial room for improvement in culturally preparing advisors for duty in Afghanistan. Rather, institutional measures have improved such as the 60-day training program at Fort Riley, Kansas that includes cultural awareness training, which must be attended prior to arrival in a country.[89] Zbylut et al. found that cultural tolerance was of significant importance to the advisorial relationship (Table 7). Understanding this, it becomes apparent that cultural misunderstandings and faux pas can have a substantially negative impact on advisory operations.

[88] Ibid. 58–59.

[89] Christopher Bluesteen. *Combat Advising: Three Challenges We Must Overcome to Succeed in Afghanistan* (Small Wars Journal, 2009).

Relationship Building Behavior	Mean F-I Composite	Mean Importance Rating	Mean Frequency Rating
Demonstrate tolerance toward individuals from another culture.	17.33	4.14	3.97
Be tactful toward individuals from another culture.	17.09	4.16	3.91
Actively listen to individuals from another culture.	16.17	4.05	3.76
Behave respectfully within the constraints of the relevant culture.	16.02	4.14	3.66
Build a close relationship with your counterpart.	15.36	4.15	3.45
Communicate to your counterpart that you respect him.	14.71	4.07	3.4
Ask about your counterpart's family.	13.73	3.83	3.26
Gain the trust of individuals from the relevant culture.	13.17	3.85	3.11
Be supportive of a counterpart's decisions and activities.	12.99	3.89	3.06
Spend "unstructured time" with your counterpart.	12.16	3.71	2.91
Express compassion toward individuals of a different culture.	11.28	3.46	2.83
Employ a Rapport Plan (continuously plan, execute, and refine methods to increase the closeness of the relationship with your counterpart).	9.87	3.21	2.48
Share your personal history or information with your counterpart.	9.03	3.08	2.36
Importance ratings scale: 5—Extremely important, 4—Very important, 3—Moderately important, 2—Some importance, 1—Little importance, 0—None. Frequency ratings: 5—More than once a day, 4—Once a day, 3—Once a week, 2—Once a month, 1—A few times, 0—Did not perform.			

Table 7. Relationship Building Behaviors Arranged in Descending Order by F-I Composite Scores.[90]

Afghanistan is distinct from Korea and Vietnam in that, rather than being a region inhabited by a relatively homogeneous population such as Korea or Vietnam; Afghanistan's population encompasses dozens of distinct ethno-linguistic groups and

[90] Zbylut, et al. 2009. 83.

sub-groups in a tribal system. Ethnic identity plays a key role in Afghan society and permeates virtually every facet of daily life.[91] The largest and most dominant of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan are the Pashtuns, whose *Pashtunwali* tribal ethos necessitates proper understanding by outsiders if meaningful interaction is to occur. Furthermore, ethnic Pashtuns reside on both sides of the current conflict in Afghanistan with personnel fighting for both the ANA as well as the Taliban, who are primarily Pashtun. *Pashtunwali* concepts such as *badal* (revenge), *ghayrat* (honor) and *nanawati* (sanctuary) are integral to Pashtun customary law, and can drastically conflict with Western notions of law and order. Further compounding this issue is the over-representation of ethnic Tajiks within the ANA. Ethnic Tajiks account for approximately 27% of the total population of Afghanistan but as of April 2009 accounted for 36% of the "ethnically-balanced" ANA.[92] Over-representation within the officer and Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) corps is even more striking with at least one estimate stating, "70 percent of the battalion commanders are Tajiks."[93] Such readily observable over-representation fuels ethnic tension among other ethnic groups. Additionally, ANA units that are disproportionally Tajik, face significant difficulty when operating in predominantly Pashtun areas due to the mutual unintelligibility of Dari/Tajik (spoken by Tajiks) and Pashto (spoken by Pashtuns).

Initial operations in Afghanistan, post-9/11, suffered from an insufficient understanding of these concepts and their importance to the Pashtuns as well as other similar norms and values integral to the various other Afghan tribes' (Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, etc.) way of life. A direct and focused effort by senior military planners to integrate Afghan cultural awareness training into predeployment operations was required to mitigate the cultural disparity. Unfortunately, the years of "search and destroy"

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[91] See Antonio Giustozzi, and Noor Ullah. 2006. *"Tribes" and warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005*. London: Crisis States Research Centre. http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp7.2.pdf. and Thomas H. Johnson. *Democratic Nation Building in the Arc of Crisis: The Case of the Presidential Election in Afghanistan*. (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2006). http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA484217.

[92] Anthony H., Cordesman, Adam Mausner, and David Kasten. *Winning in Afghanistan: creating effective Afghan security forces*. (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2009.). 74.

[93] Antonio Giustozzi. "Afghanistan's National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanization," *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 6, Issue 9, May 2008.

operations, night raids, and psy-op campaigns that preceded, increased cultural understanding that likely polarized a substantial portion of the Afghan population against the "foreign invaders." Thus, more than ever in Afghanistan, it is vital for military advisors to possess sufficient cultural understanding of their counterpart, regardless of ethnicity, in order for the sufficient rapport to develop that leads to an effective advisory relationship.

U.S. military advisor selection and training for advisory operations in Afghanistan had a significant impact on their overall effectiveness in building security capacity within their Afghan counterpart's security apparatus. Additionally, tour length and rotation schedules influenced effectiveness is a similar manner as that in Korea and Vietnam. The most dramatic improvements in advisor training occurred in the aforementioned language and cultural indoctrination, while specialized training related to the specific duties an advisor would assume largely remained lacking. In addition to language and culture the training received at Fort Riley, Kansas consists of only combat lifesaver (CLS) certification, and generalized combat skill development and sustainment. Advisors are still selected primarily on the basis of MOS and overseas operational tour availability. Priority of assignments of advisors is placed on those possessing combat arms specialties, and experience due to the emphasis placed on promoting infantry-centric Afghan military capacity. According to a RAND survey of Army and Marine Corps personnel, there is nothing within the advisor selection process that "seeks those better suited for this mission to be advisors."[94] By comparison, NATO improved predeployment training for advisors in 2009 with the establishment of the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfelsm Germany, the Joint Force Training Center (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland and three days of training in Kabul prior to assignment with ANA units.[95] Such a disparity in the training pipeline for advisors caused coordination issues with U.S. personnel operating in ETTs, MTTs and NATO personnel in OMLTs who were jointly employed under the authority of NTM-A by 2009. The creation of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), which assumed responsibility for all advising, alleviated some of this

[94] Kelly, et al. 2011. 83.

[95] Ibid. 59–60.

confusion, but distinct differences between U.S. and international advisory teams continue to frustrate Afghan personnel. Specifically, OMLTs are often assigned for six-month periods in contrast to ETTs that are assigned typically for one-year tours. Unfortunately, the current ANA Kandak work-cycle is a nine-month cycle, which necessitates an advisory team turn-over in the middle of that unit's training or operation phase, thus significantly degrading rapport as counterparts acclimate post-turnover. The reforms initiated thus far in improving advisor training are promising, but significant improvements must still be initiated to account for disparate deployment schedules and the inherent rigors of advisory operations that extend well beyond the predeployment preparations currently in practice for U.S advisory personnel.

Governing policy of all the identified vital factors, plays the most significant role in influencing advisory operations in Afghanistan. As the Korea and Vietnam case studies have shown, the far-reaching effects of U.S. security policy and strategic decision making have a dramatic effect on an advisor's ability to complete his assigned mission. Perhaps no more significant governing policy issue negatively influenced advisors in Afghanistan than the gradual increase in desired ANSF force quantity without a sufficient increase in the availability of resources to the U.S. advisory effort. The original goal set in 2002 was to create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA not to exceed 70,000 personnel. Seventy-thousand was deemed sufficient to provide for the self-defense of Afghanistan following what was then considered a successful suppression of Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the region. By February 2008, amidst a dramatic increase in Taliban activity and mounting pressure, the U.S., NATO and the Government of Afghanistan committed to an additional 10,000 personnel bring the total to 80,000.[96] By August 2008 instability, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces, prompted Secretary Gates to announce an agreement that would bring the size of the ANA to 134,000 personnel.[97]

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[96] U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. *Afghanistan security further congressional action may be needed to ensure completion of a detailed plan to develop and sustain capable Afghan National Security Forces: report to congressional committees.* (Washington, D.C., 2008) http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS96561. 6.

[97] Louise Radnofsky. "Gates Supports Doubling Size of Afghan Force," *Wall Street Journal*, August 9, 2008.

Throughout this period, manning and resources available to advisory operations only slightly increased in contrast to the massive demands for increased output for trained Afghan military personnel. U.S. ETTs suffered from an extreme under manning issue, placing several ANA units with either half-staffed ETTs or no ETT at all depending on their position in their training cycle (Figure 1). ISAF OMLTs suffered similar under manning issues (Figure 2). Additionally, as the ANSF force ballooned in size, no substantial change occurred regarding their training or operational employment. U.S. advisors were faced with a situation that necessitated turning out trained personnel as rapidly as possible despite being hugely undermanned, with those units that were created with almost zero capacity for logistics or other support operations. The result became an ANA encompassed of thousands of riflemen who could perhaps successfully engage the enemy on the battlefield, but were completely reliant on their U.S. advisors for such basic necessities and food and water resupply.



Figure 1. U.S. ETT Personnel Required and Assigned, 2007–2013(From:[98])

[98] Kelly, et al. 2011. 43. Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 38. Note: Data after November 2008 are ISAF projections.



Figure 2. ISAF OMLTs Required and Assigned, 2007–2013(From:[99])

Fiscal dependency of the Government of Afghanistan on foreign aid, primarily that of the U.S., to support their rapidly growing and modernizing security apparatus, presented military advisors with some inherent challenges. According to the GAO, NTM-A/CSTC-A estimates the cost to fund 171,600 personnel (most current ANA personnel requirement as of this research) from fiscal year 2012 on, to be approximately $4.2 to $4.5 billion annually. However, this estimate has not been officially promulgated by the U.S. Department of Defense.[100] Though international aid to Afghanistan is likely even post-transition, the Afghan government will eventually be required to assume responsibility for funding its security apparatus. Currently, the Afghan government only contributes a small portion of funding relative to its total expenditures (Figure 3). Additionally, the International Monetary Fund estimates that the Afghan government will not be able to cover its operating costs through the development of sufficient revenue

[99] Kelly, et al. 2011. 44. Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, p. 39. Note: Data after November 2008 are ISAF projections.

[100] U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. *Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined. (*GAO-11-66, Jan 27, 2011). http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1166.pdf. 30.

until at least 2023.[101] Without significant future funding from the international community, guaranteed for at least the next ten to fifteen years, the Afghan government will simply not be able to maintain its security apparatus as NTM-A and the international community have designed it. Further compounding this issue are instances of failed delivery of financial pledges by international governments and institutions. Specifically, in 2009 the international community pledged a total of $5,814,620 to Afghan development aid, however, by November 2009 only $1,784,020, or 30 percent, had been disbursed.[102] Every state or institution that pledged funds failed to disburse in full with the exception of Luxembourg, the Russian Federation, Spain and Estonia (who actually dispersed more funds than pledged).[103] Financial instability can potentially have the most dramatic affect of the ANSF of the all challenges previously discussed. Once security personnel fail to receive their paycheck as promised and funding for training and equipment dries up most Afghans previously employed by the ANSF will simply return to their homes to look for alternate means of providing for their families.

[101] International Monetary Fund, *Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Sixth Review Under the Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, Request for Waiver of Nonobservance of a Performance Criterion, Modification and Performance Criteria, and Rephasing and Extension of the Arrangement, Country Report* No. 10/22 (Washington, D.C.: January 2010).

[102] Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Finance (GIRoA MoF), Donor Financial Review, Report 1388, November 2009, http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/Donor'sFinancialReview%20ReportNov2009.pdf. 46.

[103] Ibid. Note: Cited report notes incomplete data submission from 19 of the 47 countries listed.



Figure 3. Afghan Revenues and Total Expenditures, 2008–2013(From:[104])

A review of the body of literature pertaining to U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and specifically, military advisors engaged in security cooperation operations reveals several parallels with similar operations in Korea and Vietnam. As with the Korea and Vietnam case studies, all of the vital factors identified in Chapter II were present in Afghanistan. Table 8 illustrates the degree to which each of the factors influenced advisors in Afghanistan. The most significant factors relative to Korea and Vietnam were Language Proficiency, Governing Policy and Fiscal Dependency. The overall influence of Language Proficiency diminished mostly due to the increased availability of effective interpreters. The influence of Governing Policy and Fiscal Dependency significantly increased in comparison to the other two cases. U.S. foreign and security policy as described above significantly contributed to this increase.

[104] GAO. 2011. *Afghanistan Security.* 32.

	Language Proficiency	Cultural Training	Tour Length	Advisor Selection & Training	Governing Policy	Indigenous Forces Training	Fiscal Dependency
Afghanistan	3	4	5	5	6	4	6

Table 8. Vital Factors Influencing Advisors in Afghanistan

C. CONCLUSION

Analysis of the available research and data pertaining to U.S. advisory operations in Afghanistan demonstrates an evolution in some aspects from previous operations in Korea and Vietnam while other factors remain roughly constant. The obstacle of language proficiency that had plagued military advisors throughout history has significantly been mitigated through the use of interpreters and the substantial increase of their availability to all advisory units. An emphasis on the importance of cultural training is evident from an analysis of Afghanistan, though because the country is distinct in its ethno-linguistic diversity the challenge of developing mutual cultural understanding will likely persist for years to come. Tour length for U.S. military advisors has largely remained constant at approximately twelve to eighteen months, and will likely continue as a matter of concern for the quality of life of U.S. military personnel and their families back home. Advisor selection and training has experienced limited improvement in comparison to Korea and Vietnam structurally, but the results of these changes are apparent in the relative success of advisors in Afghanistan adapting to their environment and completing their assigned mission. Training of the host nation's indigenous forces has also largely remained constant through each of the three cases and is heavily influenced by the other vital factors. Governing policy and fiscal dependency are the two vital factors where Afghanistan is significantly worse off than Korea and Vietnam. U.S. security and foreign policy with respect to Afghanistan create near daily challenges in the development of Afghan military forces. The long-term sustainability of the ANSF is highly questionable given the annual requirement of multi-billion dollar financial assistance packages to keep the ANSF and the Government of Afghanistan operating. Significant reform with respect to these factors is necessary to prevent a relapse into total instability following U.S. and NATO military drawdowns in the region.

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V. CASE STUDIES COMPARISON

A. INTRODUCTION

After a thorough analysis of military advisors in all three case studies, Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, an accurate portrayal of the degree to which each of the vital factors influences advisory operations becomes apparent. The body of literature related to the topic addresses each factor in substantial detail. Scholarly research and anecdotal accounts of advisory operations portrays each of the vital factors as substantially influential in the overall effectiveness of advisors charged with the development of self-sufficient security capability of the indigenous security apparatus. The benefit of hindsight into the Korea and Vietnam cases provides valuable information regarding the long-term implications of these factors, which can then be applied to the current operations within Afghanistan. Utilizing the same metric to evaluate each of the cases, the Likert Scale provides an accurate depiction of how each of the factors changed over time. Given the subjective nature of how each of the factors was coded, it is not possible to logically infer trend analysis of these factors over time. Rather, the data illustrates the frequency that each factor influenced advisory operations (Table 9) in each case making it possible to infer the relative importance of each of the factors in order to develop policy recommendations for the future improvement of advisory operations as a whole, which are included in the final chapter.

	Language Proficiency	**Cultural Training**	**Tour Length**	**Advisor Selection & Training**	**Governing Policy**	**Indigenous Forces Training**	**Fiscal Dependency**
Korea	6	5	4	5	3	4	3
Vietnam	6	4	5	5	6	4	4
Afghanistan	3	4	5	5	6	4	6

Table 9. Vital Factors Influencing Advisors Composite

B. CASE STUDY COMPARISON

Utilizing the data developed in each of the case studies and coded utilizing the Likert Scale, it is possible to visually depict the vital factors influencing military advisors in a radar chart, or spider-web chart (Figures 4, 5, and 6). Radar charts are a means of

graphically representing multivariate data in a two-dimensional form with quantitative variables placed on the axes originating from the same point. Utilization of a radar chart makes identification of differences and similarities more readily apparent in comparison to depiction in simple table form. Utilizing the Likert Scale, as described in Chapter I, when analyzing the data shown in Figure 4, it is immediately apparent that all vital factors were present in each of the case studies. Had a factor not been present, the resulting line would cross the central point of origin, which is not the case for each of the three case studies. Additionally, because each of the vital factors contributed significant influence relative to each case study the resulting polygon is rather large. If several of the factors had contributed minimal influence relative to the case, the resulting polygon would be rather small.



Figure 4. Vital Factors in Korea Radar Distribution



Figure 5. Vital Factors in Vietnam Radar Distribution



Figure 6. Vital Factors in Afghanistan Radar Distribution

C. CONCLUSION

All of the vital factors influencing military advisors as presented in this thesis are well represented in Figures 4–6, demonstrating their inclusive importance relative to advisory operations. By overlaying all three radar charts into a single composite chart, it

is possible to make a quick comparison of how each of the case studies compares relative to the vital factors (Figure 7). The only vital factor that remained constant in each of the three case studies was Indigenous Forces Training, meaning this factor influenced advisory operations "sometimes" or about 50% of the time in each case. Anecdotal evidence suggests that while this factor sometimes influences advisors it has largely been approached in much the same over the past several decades. Other factors have substantially more influence and thus have evolved over time out of necessity. Additionally, Indigenous Forces Training is somewhat of a unique factor in that, individual differences between personnel receiving U.S. specialized training, such as advanced infantry tactics at Fort Benning, Georgia, provides the same benefits whether he be Korean, Vietnamese or Afghan. Tour length also remained relatively constant across the case studies due to the persistence of the 12–18 month standard deployed ingrained in U.S. military doctrine. Anecdotal evidence shows that military leaders have put considerable thought into extending operational deployments of military advisors, but have always determined the potential cost to morale and quality of life of advisory personnel to outweigh the potential benefits of longer tours.



Figure 7. Vital Factors Composite Radar Distribution

Most telling of the vital factors are the values identified for Fiscal Dependency and Governing Policy. The influence of these factors remained high across each of the three case studies. The body of literature shows the dramatic extent to which these factors permeate near every aspect of advisory operations and have significant long-term effects on the stability within the region particularly after substantial U.S. withdraw from the region. The way in which the U.S. government approached the conduct of all military operations in each of the case studies had an immediate and dramatic impact of the ability of advisors to complete their mission. The allocation of resources, continuity of critical mission milestones, and unity of command, all hinged on the governing policy mandated by the U.S. government. The fiscal dependency that results after billions of dollars in security assistance are invested in the development of indigenous security capacity is unavoidable in instances where that nation lacks the robust economy to support a modernized security apparatus modeled on the U.S. military.

The following chapter includes policy recommendations based on the above data to improve the overall effectiveness of military advisors engaged in the development of foreign military capacity. The importance of each vital factor relative to its influence on advisors drives the degree to which policy reforms are necessary. The data shows that each of the identified vital factors has substantial influence on advisory operations. In an ideal situation financial and human capital would be unlimited and each of the vital factors could be sufficiently reformed to promote maximum efficiency and effectiveness of military advisors. However, given the limited financial and human capital available to the U.S. government to seek improvement of advisory operations it becomes necessary to conduct cost/benefit analysis to determine which factors would result in the best outcome after reform takes place.

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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

The achievements of advisory operations in Afghanistan, particularly since 2008, should not be completely overlooked. The U.S. and ISAF have succeeded in many areas where their predecessors have failed. However, there is still a long road ahead if Afghanistan is ever going to field a self-sufficient security apparatus capable of operating independent of international assistance. ANSF development is plagued by historic rivalries and factionalism as well as challenges inherent to the introduction of modern warfare strategy and equipment. The U.S. and ISAF have only achieved limited success overcoming these challenges in the past few years with precious little time left before the significant withdraw of U.S. and NATO forces.

Security assistance and cooperation operations have succeeded in growing the force. However, numerical growth alone is insufficient to meet the task assigned to advisors of developing a capable, sustained and self-sufficient security apparatus. Utilizing the data derived from the systematic case studies, it is possible to develop tailored policy recommendations for the further improvement of advisory operations. Only through a determined effort to continually refine and adapt advisory operations policy, will effective development of the ANSF result. Failure to do so risks leaving an under-trained and under-manned Afghan military to stand alone against a highly-capable Taliban threat and ever-increasing civil unrest. While it is likely the U.S. and NATO presence will endure in some form well beyond the proposed 2013 and 2014 troop withdraw goals, the capacity for effective security development diminishes significantly with each soldier that departs Afghanistan for home.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following policy recommendations are rooted in the data derived from the aforementioned systematic case studies of military advisors in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. Utilizing the Likert Scale-coded tables in the previous chapter, it is possible to infer the relative importance of each vital factor and thus weight policy

recommendations accordingly. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in an ideal situation, the U.S. government would have unlimited resources with which to devote to reforming advisory operations. However, since resources are finite, particularly human and financial capital, it is necessary to conduct a cost/benefit analysis in order to determine what reforms, with respect to each of the vital factors, present the maximum potential beneficial outcome.

1. Language Proficiency

Language proficiency significantly influenced advisory operations in Korea and Vietnam and somewhat less so in Afghanistan. Such a development is promising, but further reform in this area could lead to increased effectiveness of U.S. military advisors through a better establishment of rapport between counterparts and increased efficiency of daily communication. My initial assumption that military advisors would significantly benefit from high levels of local language proficiency, or that those advisors would at least place a high level of importance on communicating effectively in the host language turned out to not be valid. As noted in Chapter IV, the increased availability of qualified and effective interpreters has substantially mitigated the negative effects of minimal host nation language proficiency among advisors. Therefore, it would not be prudent to argue for a significant increase in the amount of language training given to perspective military advisors during their predeployment training. In an ideal situation, every advisor would develop fluency in the language of the nation to which he will be assigned in order to communicate most effectively with his counterpart. In practical application, this is simply not feasible given dynamic operational timelines and rapid turnover of advisory personnel. Specifically, Dari and Pashto, the two most commonly spoken languages in Afghanistan, are classified as Category III languages. Fluency training programs at the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, require 36 weeks of rigorous instruction for minimum fluency for Category III languages.[105] Therefore, it is simply not possible to train perspective advisors to such a level of fluency within the short amount of time available for predeployment training. Fluency in the host nation language should not be

[105] Defense Language Institute, Foreign Learning Center. Program Overview – Multi-language School. http://www.dliflc.edu/emerginglanguage.html

considered a requirement for personnel assigned to advisory operations. Chapter IV did identify the capability to communicate common phrases such as greetings as beneficial to the development of rapport between themselves and their counterpart. For this reason, it is my recommendation that predeployment language training should focus on common phrases and greetings as well as the dynamics of communicating via an interpreter in order to maximize advisory effectiveness.

2. Cultural Training

A well-developed understanding of the culture and history of the environment within which an advisor is assigned is vital to his success. Specific and directed study of the cultural norms and values that exist among the people who inhabit the region is required to develop such a high level of understanding. The narrative discussed in the previous chapters illustrates the severe consequences that can arise as a result of insufficient cultural awareness of a military advisor. Furthermore, mutual understanding between counterparts leading to high levels of rapport can only develop through a relationship founded not just upon military professionalism, but true interpersonal understanding that includes mutual cultural acceptance. It is my recommendation that future predeployment training for personnel assigned to advisory duties include a robust cultural awareness program. Such a program must incorporate relevant topics such as history of the region, religion, and customs (such as *Pashtunwali*) that have a substantial influence on the conduct and perceptions of the host nation populace. Every effort should be made to provide region experts such a career foreign service officers or academic professionals with substantial in-country experience to deliver this training to perspective advisors. Cultural awareness PowerPoint presentations are wholly insufficient for this task. Furthermore, advisors would significantly benefit from continued educational opportunities once they arrive in country that expand on their cultural understanding at the most localized level for the region in which they are assigned. Based on the above case studies, it is not possible to develop too much cultural understanding. Advisors and their counterparts significantly benefit from this factor.

3. Tour Length

The case studies demonstrate that tour length of advisors assigned to advisory operations does significantly influence their ability to complete their assigned mission. Operational tours that do not coincide with host nation training and operational cycles can have a significant negative effect on the combat effectiveness of indigenous military units. However, the anecdotal evidence discussing the possible extension of advisor tour length does not adequately support operational tours for advisors beyond 24-months. The costs to an advisor's morale and quality of life as a result of such prolonged periods away from his family outweigh the potential benefits of more time in country. It is my recommendation that operational deployment of military advisors remain at the current duration. However, I believe the case studies provide ample evidence to suggest that military planners must attempt to better align Afghan training and operational cycles with those advisory units assigned to them. Transition from one advisory unit to another is inevitable, but the timing of that transition with respect to operational phase of the Afghan unit can be accounted for in long-term planning. Transitions should occur between the training and operational phases of Afghan units to provide continuity of advisory operations during these two distinct phases.

4. Advisor Selection and Training

The influence of Advisor Selection and Training was evident in each of the above case studies. As stated in Chapter IV, there is currently no specific guideline in the selection process of personnel that seeks those who may be better suited for advisory duties, to serve as military advisors. There is currently no MOS for "military advisor" as mentioned in the Zbylut, et al. study.[106] Thus, lacking a clearly defined career path, which builds experience through years of operational advisory duties, it is necessary to refine the selection process for those who will be assigned to advisory duties. Every effort should be made to select personnel with previous operational tours in the region they are to be assigned. Interagency and Joint-staff experience should also be a consideration as they impart valuable interpersonal coordination and communication

[106] Zbylut, et al. 2009. 103.

skills. Personal factors such adaptability, openness to foreign cultures, and family situations, should all be considered in selecting the best candidates for such a demanding job.

Advisor training, beyond the aforementioned language and cultural training, needs significant reform to better prepare advisors for the rigors of the operations they are to be assigned. Tactical and technical proficiency in the area specialty of the indigenous units they will be assigned to (infantry, armor, intelligence, etc.) is insufficient alone to conduct successful advisory operations. Prospective advisors should receive adequate training on the development of rapport, administrative functions, related security assistance programs, civil-military relations, and numerous other topics depending on the local region they are to be assigned to. For example, it is not uncommon for combat arms units to be assigned policing duties within a post-conflict state, a task they potentially received little to no training in prior to arrival, especially with regard to the local laws and judiciary system. Historically, senior military leaders have heavily relied on an advisor's ability to adapt to their individual situation rather than adequately provide training prior to arrival. Advisors will become significantly more efficient and effective if provided training relevant to their individual assignment prior to arrival in country.

5. Governing Policy

The single most influential factor identified in this thesis was Governing Policy. Advisors in each case study were significantly influenced by this factor with a substantial increase in frequency during the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars. The advisor's overall mission, the development of friendly military capability within the assigned region, has been hindered by significant structural challenges. Ambiguous command relationships between the advisory command and parent organizations, negatively influencing allocation of resources and operational priorities, can result from weak governing policy. As noted in the Afghanistan case study, advisors suffered from a confusing dual-command structure that required reporting procedures through both CSTC-A and Task Force Phoenix. Both had authority over U.S. advisors making it often difficult to assess operational priorities when expectations were dissimilar between the two units.

Additionally, non-U.S. NATO advisors reported to yet another command authority through ISAF, making coordination between advisory units and their Afghani counterparts confusing and inefficient. The creation of ISAF Joint Command alleviated many of the coordination and reporting issues by placing all advisors under one command authority. However, other governing policy issues continue to detract from advisory efforts.

The substantial under manning of ETTs and OMLTs in Afghanistan is indicative of insufficient governing policy and has had a dramatic negative effect on advisory operations in the region. As noted in Chapter IV, there has existed and continues to exist a critical shortfall in the numbers of both U.S. and ISAF advisory personnel. Numerous agencies have reported on this critical shortfall, to include the Department of Defense[107], and yet a substantial increase in available personnel for the advisory mission is not forthcoming. In order for the ANSF to begin building quality rather than simply quantity, it is imperative that sufficient advisory personnel are deployed to the region to fulfill the required billets within U.S. training teams. My recommendation to reform this vital factor is simple; allocate adequate personnel to U.S. training teams based on the personnel required within the current planning documents rather than allocating approximately 50%.

6. Indigenous Force Training

The vital factor of Indigenous Forces Training was present in each of the case studies, but did not necessarily have as much influence on advisors as the other vital factors. This is not to say that Indigenous Force Training is not important, rather the influence of this factor is simply less relative to the other vital factors identified in this thesis. Indigenous personnel clearly benefitted in each of the three cases from exposure to U.S. run training programs, particularly those located within the United States that provided immersion in not just U.S. military culture, but U.S. culture in general. Such an experience provided the opportunity for increased understanding between counterparts in

[107] Department of Defense, *Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, January 2009, 38-39.

the advisory relationship. It is my recommendation that such programs be expanded to provide such an experience to a larger percentage of personnel within the ANSF. Such an expansion could become increasingly more important in the coming years as U.S. and ISAF troop levels diminish in the region making training programs internal to Afghanistan more limited in capacity. Training facilities within the U.S. meanwhile will continue to operate at a relatively high capacity. Additionally, continued coordination in this manner with ANSF personnel, particularly battalion-level commanders, will likely promote more effective interoperability between U.S. and Afghan into the future. Funding for such programs is available with existing U.S. security assistance programs. All that is required is a focused emphasis on the development of Afghan personnel rather than some of the United States' other foreign allies.

7. Fiscal Dependency

After Governing Policy, Fiscal Dependency of the Afghan government on foreign financial assistance to manage its annual budget is the next most influential of the vital factors identified in this thesis. Unfortunately, it is perhaps the most difficult to reform given the rather bleak outlook for the development of the Afghan economy over the next decade. Many of the policies adopted by the U.S., NATO and the Afghan Government are irreversible with respect to the budgetary requirements of the ANSF that have been created to date. Security assistance programs that provided former Warsaw Pact nations' surplus equipment to the ANSF have resulted in a Afghan military logistics system that includes outdated and in many cases non-operational equipment after several years of hard-use and insufficient maintenance. Initially, these programs provided vital equipment such as basic infantry weapons and vehicles quickly and at a very modest cost. However, over time, the expense required to keep Afghan units equipped has grown exponentially. The best possible scenario to mitigate the negative influence of fiscal dependency in Afghanistan is increased emphasis by security cooperation and assistance planners in developing the Afghan military logistics infrastructure. Such efforts must also coincide with international foreign policy reforms of the partner nations operating within Afghanistan to promote Afghan economic growth. In post-conflict states defense

often accounts for a substantial portion of the government's annual budget, making prolonged economic growth vital to the sustainment of an effective security apparatus.

C. CONCLUSION

Addressing the 2006 TRADOC/Combat Studies Institute Military History Symposium, Lieutenant General David Petraeus (now General, USA (ret.)) quoted British General Sir William Butler, who remarked in 1889, "The nation that insists on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools, and the thinking done by cowards."[108] Thus, in order to avoid such a situation, it is imperative that professional military officers become both the fighting man and the thinking man. An avenue to achieving this aim is dedicated scholarly research into our nation's military history. Following World War II, security cooperation operations became a vital component of U.S. foreign and security policy. Inherent within these operations was the role of the U.S. military advisor. This thesis identified seven vital factors influencing a military advisor's effectiveness in his assigned mission of developing indigenous military capability among partner nations. Utilizing the Korean and Vietnam wars as case studies, this thesis identified the relative importance of each of the factors for application to the current advisory effort in Afghanistan. By applying the data developed through the systematic case studies it was then possible to recommend policy reforms aimed at increasing the overall effectiveness of advisory operation in Afghanistan.

Reforming advisory operations in Afghanistan alone will not end the violence and instability in the region. For example, the growing insurgency against the U.S., NATO, and the Government of Afghanistan presents a significant obstacle to peace within the region. Tribal rivalries and civil unrest due to questions about the legitimacy of the Karzai government will persist regardless of military advisory reform. Advisory reform will in time help to alleviate concerns over the current policy of quantity over quality in the development of the ANSF. Recent data shows that the ANSF is growing at a rapid

[108] Kendall D. Gott, and Michael G. Brooks. *Security assistance: U.S. and international historical perspectives*. (Fort Leavenworth, Kan: Combat Studies Institute Press. Combat Studies Institute Military History Symposium, 2006). 3.

rate as they reach the desired personnel strength goals on time. However, the ability of these Afghan units to actually provide for the defense of Afghanistan remains in question. Additionally, the current method of counting personnel toward total force strength once they have met the initial vetting procedures skews the data. The total number of personnel trained, equipped and assigned within the ANSF is of vital importance to transition efforts, yet it not made clear in any of the U.S.'s and ISAF's unclassified documents. Non-standardized reporting of attrition and absenteeism further distorts the data. Effective and efficient advisory operations are necessary in order to develop the self-sufficient capability of the ANSF to stand on its own following U.S. and ISAF withdrawal.

Based on the data included in the previous chapters, a significant lack of required training personnel and requisite funding would plague the ANSF for the foreseeable future without a dedicated commitment by the international community. The growth and capability requirements set forth by the U.S. and Afghan governments necessitate increased deployment of training personnel to Afghanistan over the next several years. Without qualified trainers to impart advanced skill sets to the ANSF, the Afghan government will lack the ability to continue counterinsurgency efforts upon the withdrawal of international military forces. Afghanistan will also be financially dependent on the international community to fund its government and its exceedingly expensive security apparatus for at least the next decade, possibly much longer.

The vital factors influencing military advisors identified in this thesis provide a framework for a future reform of U.S. advisory operations. The historical narrative encompassed by the included Korean and Vietnam case studies illustrated the importance of these factors within the context of security cooperation. Security assistance and cooperation operations have become a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and security policy by promoting stability within partner states and interoperability between U.S. and friendly forces in times of conflict. It is essential that such operations become more efficient and effective in the coming years as U.S. defense budgets face significant cutbacks despite the on-going instability within Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has been often referred to as the "Graveyard of Empires." Success or failure of the United States' military campaign in Afghanistan will have significant repercussion within the international community. U.S. failure in Afghanistan may indicate to its adversaries that, similar to the Soviet Union in the 1980's, the U.S. is in a state of rapid decline. Conversely, successful development of the Afghan security apparatus and the promotion of stability in the region signal to both the United State's allies and adversaries that it is still the world's preeminent military power. Afghanistan is a case where traditional military operations are wholly insufficient to promote long-term stability. Only successful development of the Afghan security apparatus can lead the way to development and modernization of the Afghan state. Effective military advisors are essential to this task. Only by mitigating the negative effects of the vital factors influencing military advisors can U.S. military operations in Afghanistan achieve mission success.

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